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ABSTRACT

This thesis has attempted an analysis of the foreign
policy of the East African states - Kenya, Tanzania and
Uganda.

Probably raoreso than in the case of older esta

blished states, their foreign policy is an extension of
domestic,policies to the international scene.

National

survival, preservation of independence and the achieve
ment of better living standards for the generally poor
population are the important factors that influence the
decision-makers in their choice of foreign policy orien
tations.
After Chapter one which constitutes a general back
ground to this study, Chapter two is designed to provide
factual knowledge that could enable the reader to develop
a degree of insight into the tasks facing emerging states
striding towards political modernization and rapid socio
economic development.

In Chapter three, we are exposed

to the dilemmas of ideology and the ambiguities inherent
in the concept of Pan-Africanism.

The initial attempts

of the leaders to federate East Africa were founded on
the appeals of Pan-Africanism, a common heritage and
certain geopolitical factors but events soon proved to
them that not even this complex of factors would necessa
rily lead to political integration.

Ill
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The Pan-Africanist theme also extended to Chapter
four where specific inter-governmental problems have been
considered.

In their border disputes and territorial

claims, Kenya and Tanzania readily invoked the O.A.U.
articles to push their cases against Somalia and Malawi
respectively.

On the other hand, Tanzania refused to be

guided by the O.A.U. resolution in her recognition of a
secessionist state in Nigeria.

Nevertheless all the East

African states honoured the O.A.U. resolutions on the Congo
and the Arab-Israeli conflicts.
Chapter five has probed into the theory and practice
of nonalignment in East Africa.

Within the framework of

global politics, nonalignment can be deprived as noncommitment
in the Cold War conflict system.

But in East Africa, nonalign

ment may be deprived not only in terms of non-participation
in the Cold War but also in regards to the pursuit of nar
rower national interests.

Because of the need for accele

rated economic development the East African states'have
chosen to draw advantages from both East and West without
getting involved in the Cold War conflicts.

This chapter

also considered the similarities and differences between
declaratory policies, attitudinal orientation and operative
policies of these states in the pursuit of nonalignment.
Lastly, a brief study has been made into the policies
toward the United Nations.

iv

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ACKNOIÆESGEIEKTS
It is not very easy to write a thesis on a field where
little pertinent study has been made before.

My task in

assembling data for this study has involved me in direct
contact with the Governments of East Africa,

I would like

to acknowledge my foremost appreciation to Er. E.D. Briggs,
my supervisor, who directed the research and also helped in
tapping useful sources of materials.
My debts of gratitude also go to Mr. Bruce Burton and
Mr. P.R. Burrell for their careful reading and invaluable
suggestions.

Despite the limitations of materials, the con

scientiousness of my supervisor and the guiding suggestions
of my readers, I hold no pretentions to the infallibility
of my approach.

Errors of fact and sins of misinterpreta

tions remain, unhappily, to be entirely my ot-m responsibi
lity.
Lastly, I would like to thank the staff of InterLibrary Loans for making available their facilities for
collecting information on the United Nations.

Special

thanks also to Dr. R.H. Uagenberg and Mr. L. Brown-John for
their hints on data-gathering and to Mrs. Devine for typing
the scripts.
V

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
ABSTRACT

ill

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

v

CHAPTER
I

II

III

IV

*
THE EAST AFRICAN STATES

1

The Land and People

2

Economic Resources

8

DOMESTIC POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
Leadership

19

Stability, Ideology & Political Institutions

23

EAST AFRICAN FEDERATION & PAN-AFRICANISM

43

The East African Federation

48
65

Border Problems, Territorial Disputes and
Neighbourliness

66

Three Crises - Congo, Nigeria, Arab-Israeli

?4

EAST AFRICA AND THE WORLD

84

Theory of Nonalignment
Relations with East

& West

85
(including the
Commonwealth)

Policies to the United Nations
VI

^-3

Pan-Africanism and the O.A.U.

ATTITUDES TO OTHER AFRICAN STATES

V

: 1?

CONCLUSION

89
109
117

APPENDICES

123

BIBLIOGRAPHY

134

VITA AUC TORIS

139

VI

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER I

THE EAST AFRICAN STATES
If South Africa has been a strategic enticement
and a glitter of the earth;
and West Africa has
been malaria - Dr. Azikiwe, Governor-General of
Nigeria wanted to erect a statue to the mosquitohumidity and disappointing company reports;
then
East Africa has been a pleasant climate,
- A.J, Hughes, East Africa. African Library, p. 13.
The area that is generally referred to as East Africa
is çomposed of three principal states - Kenya, Tanzania
and Uganda.

Their evolution towards self-government was

slower than in the case of their counterparts in West
Africa because of many reasons.

In Kenya, good climate

had attracted a large population of European settlers.
Most of the settlers belonged to an economically dominant
class and cherished their social ties with the prosperous
and conservative forces in Europe.

Administratively, the

Africans were restricted to local government and were kept
out of central, political affairs.

This fostered tribal

ism and led to a divisive policy of provincialism.

In

Uganda, shallow nationalism and the "particular bolstering
of the position of the Kabaka and the traditionalists in
Buganda encouraged their intransigence, and this inevita
bly led to the delaying of independence."^

Tanzania was

1
A.J,Hughes, East Africa;
The Search for U n i t y , Penguin
African Library Books, Inc., Great Britain,
1963, p. 31.
1
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2
a little more fortunate.

For almost throughout the terri

tory, no single tribal unit possessed the size, wealth and
education to dominate the others.

While these factors

provide an opportunity for the rapid growth of an
organized and united demand for self-government...the
backwardness of the country meant that most officials of
the Party (TANU) were necessarily people with little or
no formal education who did not always see the long-term
implications of their attitudes, or of official Party
policy.
2
However, progress towards independence became accele
rated after i9 6 0 .

Tanganyika opened the way by securing

its independence in December, 1 9 6 1 .

This was followed by

Uganda in October 1962, despite her intertribal friction.
Ke n y a ’s independence was granted on December 11, 1963 in
response to the melodramatic attempt of the East African
territories to federate.
THE LAND AND PEOPLE
Kenya was a former British colony that was leased from
Zanzibar in 1 8 8 7 .

It is bounded on the South by Tanzania,

on the West by Uganda, on the North-West by the Sudan, on
the North by Ethiopia, on the North-East by the Somali
Republic and on the East Coast by the Indian Ocean.

It has

a total area of 224,960 square miles and had about 8.5 mil
lion people in 1962.
Africans.

Of this population, 8 million were

The non-African population of 270,321 included

2
Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom and Un i t y , London, Oxford
University Press, 1966, p. 2.
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1 7 6 , 6 1 3 Asians, 55,759 Europeans and 34,048 Arabs.

However,

the predominant African population is far from being homo
geneous.

There are fourteen distinct ethnic groups, with

the Kikuyus representing almost twenty per cent, followed
by the Luo and the Luhya, each with about thirteen percent.
Swahili, a Bantu language with a heavy Arabic admixture
and English are the official languages.
Tanzania was the name chosen on April 26, 1964, when
the former British-administered League of Nations trust
territory of Tanganyika joined in union with the Islands
of Zanzibar and Pemba to become a United Republic.

Tanga

nyika, now referred to as mainland Tanzania, is located
between Lakes Victoria, Nyasa, Tanganyika and the Indian
Ocean.

It has a total area of 362,688 square miles and is

bordered on the North by Kenya and Uganda, on the West by
Rwanda, Burundi and the Congo and on the South by Zambia,
Malawi and Mozambique.

The area was originally administer

ed by the German East Africa Company before it was passed
to Great Britain under a League of Nations mandate.

After

1946, the territory became a United Nations trust under
British supervision and on December 9, 1 9 6 1 , Tanganyika
became an independent state under Prime Minister Julius
Nyerere.
"Tanganyika is a geographical expression rather than
a nation, with 120 different tribes.

Most of these are

self-contained, isolated from their neighbors by language
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3
and other barriers."

Of the approximately 9.5 million po

pulation estimated in 1962, 99 per cent were Africans.
Others included the Indians, the Arabs and a European po
pulation of about 20,000.

The indigenous African popula

tion comprised of the Chagga, the Somalis, the Kikuyus and
the Masais.
»
Zanzibar and Pemba comprised a sultanate under British
administration before their independence on December 10,
1963.

With an area of 640 square miles, Zanzibar is the

largest Island on the east coast of Africa.

By 1958 census

figures, Zanzibar's 165,253 population was comprised of
about 7 5 . 8 per cent Africans,

I6 . 9 per cent Arab, 5.7 per

cent Indians and 0.1 per cent Europeans.

The African group

include the mainland Africans and the Shirazi who claim to
be indigenous and to have part-Persian ancestry.
For nearly two centuries after the discovery of the
Cape of Good Hope by Vasco da Gama, the Portuguese had been
very interested in Zanzibar because of its strategic posi
tion on the route to the riches of the Far East.
At the end of the seventeenth century, the inhabit
ants of Zanzibar drove out the Portuguese with the assis
tance of the Arabs of Oman, and an Arab governor was sub
sequently sent to govern.
4

3
John Gunther, Inside Africa, New York, Harper and Bro
thers, 1953, First Ed. p. 405.
4
Helen Kitchen,

A Handbook of African Affairs, New York,
Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1964,
p. 1 8 0 .
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5
For a long time the governmental structure and cultural
ties were based on the Arab pattern.

But in 1886 Britain

and Germany signed an agreement specifying their respect
ive spheres of influence within Zanzibar without reference
to the ruling Sultan.

In 1 8 9 0 , the territory was formally

proclaimed a British Protectorate under the terms of the

%
Anglo-German Heligoland Treaty.

After independence in

1 9 6 3 Zanzibar was governed by a coalition of the Arab-led

Zanzibar People’s Party and a conservative Shirazi movement
On January 12, 1964 the Afro-Shirazi Party, led by Abeid
Karume planned the coup d'etat that made him the Chief of
State.
Pemba is an adjacent island that lies twenty-five mi 
les to the northeast of Zanzibar.
square miles.

It has an area of 380

It is inhabited by a motley population of

1 3 3 , 8 5 8 people.

Together making up the United Republic of

Tanzania, Tanganyika, Zanzibar and Pemba have a combined
population estimated at 10.3 million in 1964.
The third distinct East African state is Uganda.

It

lies astride the Equator and is bounded on the east by
Kenya, on the south by Tanzania and Rwanda, on the west by
Congo Kinshasa and on the north by the Sudan.

It has an

area of about 91,000 square miles and a population of about
7.5 million.

Anthropologists have classified the African

population there into the Bantu, the Nilotic, the NiloHamitic and the Sudanic groups.

Of all the groups, the
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6
Bantus are the most numerous.

They Include the Baganda

5

tribe which constitutes the largest ethnic group in Uganda
with nearly 2 million people.

The Iteso is considered as

the second largest tribe followed by the Ankole, the Bunyoro and the Basoga each having more than half a million
people.

Other minority groups include the Asians who num

ber about 88,000 and are mainly of Indian extraction.
are primarily skilled workers and small businessmen.

They
The

9,000 Europeans in the country are primarily British.
While English is the official language, Buganda is also
spoken by a good proportion of the African population.
The early explorers discovered Uganda in the middle
of the nineteenth century.

"In 1875 the journalist-ex-

plorer, Stanley, arrived in Buganda from the East Coast
and dispatched his famous letter to the Daily Telegraph,
calling for Christian missionaries to go out and work in
the country."

5
•Buganda was
the most powerful of all the ancient
Uganda
Kingdoms.
It even lent its name in a way to the whole
territory.
Translators who were with the first British
explorers to reach the protectorate could not sort out the
changing prefixes in the language.
Buganda is the name of the Kingdom.
Buganda is the language.
Kiganda is an adjective pertaining to anything that has to
do with Buganda.
Muganda is the
name for a native of Buganda.
Baganda is the plural of Muganda.
Kabaka is the name for the King.
See John Gunther, op. c i t ., p. 425.

6
A.J. Hughes, East Africa,

p. l47.
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7
The missionaries began to arrive in large numbers after
1877.

In the few years that followed, religious wars broke

out between the Christian groups, the Muslims and the nat
ives.

Meantime Captain (later Lord) Lugard was exploring

the country further for the Imperial British East African
Company.

In 1893, the British government succeeded in col

onizing Buganda and in 1900 the Union Jack was hoisted over
the rest of Uganda by the terms of a treaty called the
Uganda Agreement.

Since then Uganda has been under the

British hegemony until she achieved her independence on
October 9, 1962 under a coalition government headed by
Prime Minister Milton Obote.
Thus, with a total area of 683,020 square miles. East
Africa is about a fifth of the size of the United States.
Kenya is about the size of England and Uganda is a little
smaller than Great Britain.

The total estimate of the po

pulation of the East African states is 26.5 million.

Of

this estimate, Africans comprised about 97.5 per cent
7
before the Asian exodus from Kenya after 1968.

7
At the time of independence, non-Africans were given the
option to apply for full Kenyan citizenship or maintain
their British passports.
But following the Kenyan goals
of economic reconstruction and the accompanying need for
local participation, government legislation was more fa
vourable to bona fide Kenyans.
This Africanization po
licy affected the Asians with British passports and they
were compelled to leave the country.
Over 3,000 moved
to Britain and many other countries.
The term "Indians"
include the Hindus, Pakistanis and Goans who had been
living in Kenya since British rule.
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ECONOMIC RESOURCES

With the possible exception of Kenya where moderate
commercial activities have offset complete reliance on ag
riculture, East African States are generally poor.

A gen

eral reason for the economic disability is the low level of
industrialization, lack of capital and difficulties in the
$
way of the improvement of native cultivation.
Poverty,
which is a common denominator in the study of East African
economies, is further compounded by specific factors in
each country.
In Kenya, the one dominant factor that has persisted
from the time of colonization to the present, is the pro
blem of land distribution.

The land problem has constitu

ted an extremely abstruse and controversial subject in the
Kenyan politics.

The Africans have constantly accused the

European population of greediness;

that they came to Africa

to grab the best land thereby leaving the native citizens
with barren tracts for cultivation.
In sixteen months (1903-4) 220,000 Highland acres were
transferred to 342 individual Europeans, and moreover huge
tracts - blocks of 300,000 acres or more - went to Europ
ean syndicates...Of the 68,700 square miles of Kenyan arable
land in 1911, 7,000 of the 42,000 European settlers held
1 6 ,0 0 0 square miles or 24 per cent of this;
five and a
half million Africans had to get along as best they could
on the rest. 8
However, in defense of their acquisition rights, the Euro
peans maintain that their area of settlement was hitherto
5 -----------

John Gunther,

Inside Africa, p. 319.
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sparsely populated by peoples with a wide variety of cul
tures, among whom the predominant folk were the Masai who
ranged with their herds over a large section of the south
ern and western highlands.

Since independence, pressure

of population and government intensive efforts to improve
native cultivation have encouraged land redistribution.
At a news conference in Nairobi on August 12, 1964, Jomo
Kenyatta said that:
The British Government has today agreed to provide the
Kenya Government with 1.5 million pounds partly by loan and
partly by gift, to enable European farms in the Kalou sa
lient, and in the Dundori-Bahati areas, to be purchased and
Africans to be settled on the land...The acreage of land in
question is around two million acres which will accommodate
200,000 families, or about a million people.
9
Notwithstanding the land disputes, Kenya is regarded as the
richest country in East Africa.

Good climate and commer

cial agriculture have encouraged Industrialization.

Cash

crops like coffee, sisal, tea and tobacco are grown on the
fertile areas, but stock-rearing is still based on tradi
tional customs.

In the big cities, especially around

Nairobi, commercial activities have flourished very well in
recent years.
Tanzania, the largest state in area and population,
is the most politically stable but also the poorest.
fact, its poverty is legendary.
Western Highlands,

In

Apart from the North-

"the greater part of the interior of

9
Jomo Kenyatta, Earambee! London, Oxford University Press,
1964, pp. 73-74.
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Tanzania represents a vast undulating plateau, averaging
2,000-4,000 feet from sea-level, whose surface is broken
by residual hills and ridges left by the lowering of the
10
plateau through denudation,"
The land configuration, low precipitation and the
native system of shifting cultivation have inhibited me♦
chanized agriculture.
The traditional peasant agriculture
al system, primarily concerned with the production of sub
sistence crops, is still regarded as a resource to be ex
ploited rather than a liability to be dispensed with.
Productivity is painfully low and industrialization is small,
In a memorandum to TANU's National Executive in June
1966, Nyerere argued that,
a poor country like Tanzania where there is in any
case little attraction for capital investment, development
depends primarily on the efforts and hard work of our own
people, and on their enthusiasm and belief that they and
their country will benefit from whatever they do.
11
Six months later, on February 5, 1967, the much-publicized
Arusha Declaration was formulated on the principle that the
self-reliance of the peasant population be matched by selfsacrifice and socialist commitment of the leadership.

Under

this strategy, the state took over the key industries.
10
Walter Fitzgerald,
Africa; A Social, Economic and Po
litical Geography of its Major Regions, London,
Methven & Go. Ltd.', 1967, p. 238.
11
John Lonsdale,
"The Tanzanian Experiment", African
Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 269, Oct. 1968, p. 333.
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banks, the export-import houses, and some of the major
foreign manufacturing enterprises.

A system of compen

sation was simultaneously organized under the Danish firm
of auditors H. C. Steen Hansen.

While the result of the

nationalization policy may be difficult to assess as yet,
Nyerere is convinced that the precarious plight of the
Tanzanian economy warranted such bold and ambitious plan
ning.

Meanwhile the peasant farmers are encouraged to

double their yield on subsistence crops along with their
few cash crops of coffee, sisal and seed beans.
In Uganda, the situation of the economy is not much
better.

The over-all problem, which is affected by a

multitude of factors, is low productivity.

Like Tanzania

and Kenya, the economy is agrarian, involving the growing
of subsistence crops, communal help in building and an
almost self-sufficient kind of living.
the economy is relatively recent.

The other side of

This is the market eco

nomy that subjects economic life to national and interna
tional trade.

It involves growing coffee for the market

and buying transistor radios and manufactured goods in re
turn.

But unlike Tanzania, Uganda is pursuing an open-

door economic policy for investments.

This is intended to

accelerate industrialization since lack of capital has
hindered industrial development.
However, in the commercial life of Uganda the Indian population-about 77,400 (I96l)-is of critical importance, and it
is believed that they control 90 per cent of the total trade
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-

'

of the country.
During colonial rule, the Indians and the European commu
nities in Uganda established a friendly relationship that
could not be found in any other part of East Africa.

This

gave the Indians a good opportunity to maintain commercial
contacts with India and many industrial countries.

They

also controlled the export- crops of cotton and coffee.
For cotton, they found a ready market in the textile in
dustry of the Bombay Presidency and coffee was sent to the
European countries.

It is interesting to note that the re

action of the nationalists was initially indifferent to
the Indian monopoly.

But after independence. Prime Minis

ter Obote encouraged native participation in commercial
life along with foreign investment.
Thus, it can be safely assumed that the East African
states ha-ve many things in common:

the most striking being

poverty and general lack of industrial development.

Sta

tistics sometimes fail to convey the social background of
an economy but they provide a basis for a comparison of
local conditions with the rest of the world.

The follow

ing two tables provide an insight into the standard of
living and level of industrialization in East Africa in
relation to some selected African countries.

12
Walter Fitzgerald,

op. c i t ., p. 246.
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TABLE I
Gross National Product of Some African Countries 1963
Population (Million)
*

G.N.P. (in U.S.#
per capita)

Kenya

8.9

90

Tanzania

10.1

70

7.2

80

.75

140

7.5

230

Nigeria

56.4

100

South Africa

18.3

530

3.6

160

12.9

170

Uganda
Congo (Brazzaville)
Ghana

Zambia
Morocco

Source:

Gilbert L. Rutman,
The Economy of Tanganyika,
New York, Frederick A. Praeger Pu
blishers 1 9 6 8 , pp. 42-7, Tables 14 &
15.
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TABLE II
Industrial Origin Of The G.N.P. Of Some African Countries
In

%,

Agriculture
Forests, Fish

1963
Mining

Manufac Trade &
Transport Other;
turing

Congo

28

19

12

18

23

Malawi

48

0

5

18

29

Morocco

32

6

14

29

19

Nigeria

65

2

5

16

12

Rhodesia

22

5

16

22

35

9

12

21

21

37

Sudan

55

0

5

16

24

Zambia

13

48

6

13

20

Kenya

43

0

9

22

26

Tanzania

60

2

4

16

18

Uganda

61

2

7

13

17

East Africa

54

2

7

17

20

South Africa

Source;

The United Nations National Accounts Yearbook for
1964, United Nations, New York
Also see Gilbert L. Rutman, The Economic Geography
of Af ri c a , New York, Frederick A. Praeger
Publishers 1968, pp. 9-12, Tables 1 & 2.
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Table I shows the Gross National Product per capita of
some selected African countries.

A salient feature of the

table is the marked poverty of the East African States as
indicated by the low G.N.P.
Table 2 gives a helpful data in assessing the low
level of industrialization and the dependence of East
African countries on agriculture.

Even the few industries

available are geared towards the processing of agricultural
and primary production for exports.

Production figures and

other measures that would be desirable for closer compari
son are not available, but it is quite clear that Kenya
has the largest industrial development.

It has a number of

food industries and a considerable number of textiles and c
shoe factories.

Uganda has some food and cotton industries

while Tanzania produces some limited forest industries,
building materials including cement and traditional food
products.
In general, the preceding analysis has been intended
to give a background information to the East African coun
tries.

Incidentally, the survey has gone some way towards

demonstrating the capabilities of the respective countries.
Geographically, the two great rift zones, the Kilimanjaro
and Kenya mountains may have provided barriers of immense
proportions for mechanized agriculture yet the landform
disadvantage should not be exaggerated.

For example,

Uganda has the greatest hydroelectric potential, how
ever, with a developable capacity of at least 2 million
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kilowatts on the Nile alone....The Owen Falls plant can be
expanded, while another very favorable site occurs only
4.5 miles downstream.
13
Similarly, the topography and climate of Kenya has made the
country a centre of tourist attraction in East Africa.
Demographically, the population of East Africa is seizable
but it is unevenly distributed on the land area.

Poor

health, high illiteracy rate, incidence of tradition and
tribal conflicts have inhibited efficiency and lowered
manpower quality in the territories.

Economically the

East African countries belong to the class of "under-dev
eloped states", where, because of scarce capital, industri
alization is scanty, productivity is low and the economy is
primarily agrarian.

Rate of growth of both Gross National

Product and industrial output may continue to be disappoin
ting owing to the poor natural resources and the outmoded
system of cultivation.

But dismal as this picture of the

East African economies may appear, the intangible side of
the countries'

capabilities is not so unattractive.

The

extent to which leadership, political institutions and
ideology have influenced political stability of the East
African states will be examined in the succeeding chapter.

13
William A. Hance, African Economic Development, New
York, Frederick A. Praeger Publish
ers 1 9 6 7 , p. 2 0 5 .
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CHAPTER II
DOMESTIC POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

For a new state, foreign policy is domestic policy
pursued by other means;
it is domestic policy car
ried beyond the boundaries of the state,
-B.C. Good, Neutralism and Nonalignment,
p. 12.
*
Professor Hermann has charged that students of inter
national affairs have "displayed considerable reluctance to
delve into the domestic factors that distinguish one nation's
policies from another's.

On the other hand, scholars of com

parative politics, with their knowledge of political insti
tutions and processes, have rarely considered the effect of

2
various political arrangements on foreign policy."

If a

research worker can underplay the influence of domestic fac
tors in the study of the foreign policy of developed count
ries, such action would be even more undesirable for a suc
cessful appraisal of the foreign policy of the East African
states. •
For European countries with an international life
going back over many c e n t u r i e s . n o t only is the subject
matter abundant for the research-worker, but there is also
a historical perspective which furnishes a more integrated
1
R.C. Good, "New State-building as a Determinant of For
eign Policy", Neutralism and Nonalignment.
L. W. Martin (ed.). New York, Frederick A.
Praeger Publishers, 1962, p. 12.

2
Hermann, O.F., "The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy",
World Politics. Volume XX, No.3, Anril 1968,
p. 521.

17
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view of the flux of events, enabling us to determine the
causes of the phenomena observed with more certainty and
precision........... Black Africa possesses neither this
long practice in international life, which allows of
broad historical perspectives, nor state structures that
have stood the test of time and use, nor a philosophy of
political power enabling the personal idiosyncrasies of
leaders to be disregarded, in theory at least.
3
But, in spite of this, the contents of politics have al
ways been the struggle for*power whether in the developed
or the developing countries, locally or on the internat
ional level.

In most cases, decisions affecting both

domestic and foreign policies are determined by the same
appropriate body.

In the new states, for example, formal

independence has been achieved, the legal myths of sov
ereignty have been donned and national elites are put in
position to make policies based on national interest.
The policies are usually intended to consolidate the fruits
and ideals of independence, to provide better standards
of living, protect the people against external aggression
and promote national identity.
Nowadays the distinction between home and foreign po
licy is largely a matter of practical convenience;
they
are two scales in the same balance, two aspects of the
Indivisible reality.
4

3
Boudou Thiam,

The Foreign Policy of African States,
New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Publi
shers, 1 9 6 5 , p. 2.

4
Ibi d, p. xi.
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Often times, internal factors project into the internation
al scene while, correspondingly, external relations may
have serious effects on domestic policy.

In this chapter,

attempts will be made to correlate the role of political
institutions, quality of leadership, ideology and the psy
chological influence of goyernmental stability within the
framework of national policy,
LEADERSHIP
"One of the great questions of history is whether si
tuations make leaders or whether it is the completely ac
cidental appearance of a certain man that makes history go
5
one way or another,"
Would there have been a Tanzania
without Julius lyerere?

Would Uganda have remained a uni

fied nation without Milton Obote?

Would there have been

peace in multi-racial Kenya without Kenyatta?

It is dif

ficult to provide any satisfactory answers to these ques
tions,

This is because most African countries depend for

leadership on a handful of men.

In many of the countries

it is hard to see beyond a single figure.

This apparent

inability to provide alternative, efficient leadership re
flects the youthfulness of the African states and the under-

5
T, P, Melady,

Profiles of African L e a de rs . Hew Y o r k ,
The Macmillan Company, 19^1 , p, 6,
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developed condition of their state machines.

But this

youth contrasts with the age of the societies which the
states enclose.

Unlike the traditional societies where

state machineries were simple and the position of the lea
der secularized, the implications of democracy and modern
state management involve enlightenment, tolerance, comp
romise and shrewd understanding of the complex factors in
international relations.

Today, mere nationalist impulses

are not sufficient pre-requisites for effective leadership.
Education, charisma and ability to unite national elites,
control over political processes, insight, perception of
dangers and ability to avoid disasters go along with lead
ership.
In Kenya, President Jomo Kenyatta is regarded as the
embodiment of nationhood.

Since independence, he has been

acclaimed as the most important single symbol of national
identification and described as
the indispensable keystone holding together the dis
parate segments of the governing Kenya African National
Union, and as the one authoritative voice capable of re
assuring the country's remaining 55,000 European settlers
that independence would not usher in another Congo,
6
As an unimpeachable freedom fighter, jailed and persecuted
in the process of decolonization, he has endeared himself
to the people with a charisma that is indispensable in the
new state building.

Similarly, as a member of the dominant

6
Helen Kitchen,

A Handbook of African Affairs, New York,
Frederick A, Praeger Publishers 1964, '
p. 74,
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Kikuyu tribe and a paternal figure in an age-group conscious
society, Kenyatta commands the allegiance of the majority
of the Kenya people.

Above all, in contemporary African

politics where provincialism and local interests have re
sulted in the overthrow of various civilian governments,
he has chosen to be pragmatic rather than ideological, m o 
derate rather than radical,» These character traits have
helped tremendously in accomodating the ambitious elite
group and in projecting national goals above partisan in
terests,

Abroad, Kenyatta's popularity and prestige con

tinue to increase in spite of his seldom travelling beyond
the country's bofders,
Tanzania is led by an extraordinarily popular and able
leader. President Julius Nyerere,

With a Masters degree in

history and economics, Nyerere is usually regarded as one
of the intellectual leaders in Africa,

A "militant nation

alist", as he often regards himself, he is essentially id
eological, radical but humanitarian.

Some observers feel

that Nyerere's personality and temperament reflect the
kind of leadership needed for political development in a
backward economy with a dearth of technical and entrepre
neurial personnel and an excessive dependence on subsis
tence agriculture.

His eloquence and organizational abi

lity have borne an indelible imprint on the Tanganyika
African National Union,

In a country with high illiteracy

and lack of forceful elite groups, he inherits the domin
ant position in policy formulation.

Despite the fact that
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he comes from the Zanaki, which constitutes one of the
smallest tribes in Tanganyika, his qualification^as the
njost enlightened man allow him to enjoy a reign of office
that cannot be successfully challenged by other members of
his party.
In contrast to Tanzania, leadership in Uganda is more
»
complicated and unstable.
Until recently, it was difficult
to locate the effective leader of the country.

This con

fusion was caused by the cleavage between the traditional
ist Buganda's Kabaka and the more modern Prime Minister
Milton Obote,

This implies that for some time nobody real

ly maintained a monopoly of power.

The existence of a

small but well-educated African elite (Makerere University
College was established in 1921) made competition for lead
ership more pronounced.

However,

it is generally agreed that the progress which Uganda
made toward nationhood between 1 9 6 I and 1964 was due large
ly to the tactical skill of Prime Minister Obote and the
tacit cooperation of younger Baganda politicians whose id
eological sympathies lie with Mr, Obote’s party even if
they dare not risk an open break with the Buganda esta
blishment,
7
In attempting to reconcile modern politics with tribal tra
ditions, Obote has quietly and methodically cut his way
through hardships involving the use of diplomacy and ruth
lessness,

As a member of Langi, one of the smallest tribes

from northern Uganda, Obote lacks the overwhelming prestige

7
Helen Kitchen, Ibid, p, 170,
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of Kenya's veteran nationalist, Jomo Kenyatta.

Neither does

he possess the personal magnetism of his other East African
neighbour, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania,

But in spite of

these drawbacks, Obote is one of the shrewdest African di
plomats,

In his initial attempts to unite the country and

improve his political base, he married his Baganda secreta
ry in November 1963.

At the time of independence, he head

ed a coalition government that would have united the north
with Buganda,

But following the persistent outbreak of un

rest and the competitive claim of the Kabaka to leadership
in 1 9 6 6 , Obote swiftly out-manoeuvred his rival, drove him
to exile, put five of his leading ministers into detention,
suspended the constitution and established the foundation
for eventual dictatorship.

Thus, Obote proved that defer

ence and overwhelming allegiance to leadership may not be
automatic in many states but personal initiative may create
the atmosphere necessary for political tranquility.

Mean

while Obote is maintaining an uneasy peace as the dissid
ence of the traditionalist Baganda seems controlled,
STABILITY, IDEOLOGY AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
"Political stability is a condition in which there is
continuity of government, and in which some reliable pre
diction is possible regarding the broad course of policy,

8
J. W, Burton, Nonalignment, New York, J, E, Heineman,
I n c ,, 1966, p, 6 3 ,
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Theoretically there are two forms of stable government;
one is an entrenched dictatorship which guarantees the con
tinuity of both government and policy for a considerable
length of time.

The other form of stable government allows

for changes in both policy and leadership of the nation
through constitutional and orderly processes.

However,

both forms of government operate on ideology and the use
of institutions.
Ideology is a response to reality.
It maintains
solidarity and identity and promotes its ovm durability.
Ideology not only rationalizes, explaining the reasons
for the present situation;
it also points the way to
the future goal,
9
Although the East African leaders may not have provi
ded ideologies that apply to countries beyond their front
iers, catch phrases and principles such as "African Soc
ialism", "One-Party State" and "African Personality" have
been constantly used to dramatize state goals and poli
cies.
In.Kenya, African socialism means a social, democra
tic kind of welfare state that reflects government deve
lopment planning which gives no hindrance to entrepren
eurial capitalism.

In the words of Jomo Kenyatta,

we shall continue to play our part, in accelerating
capital accumulation.
And we are determined to accelerate
economic growth within the context of African Socialism,
meaning that both the Government and private enterprise

9
Vernon M c K a y , African Diplomacy; Studies in the Deter
minants of Foreign Policy, Hew York, Frederick
A, Praeger Publishers, 1966, p, 38,
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will have a contribution to make.

25

10

In fact; in the attempt to give credence to his version of
African Socialism, Jomo Kenyatta issued his Sessional Paper
Ten, which provided safeguards for private property and in
ducements for foreign investments.

Investment allowances

and special taxation privileges were likewise granted en
trepreneurs along with the provisions of the Foreign Invest
ments Protection Bill which allow free movements of capital
within and outside the country.

A pledge against fears of

nationalization was made in view of the fact that, "nation
alization will not serve to advance the cause of African
11
Socialism",
Simultaneously, the government pledged a
policy of tariff protection to pioneer and infant indust
ries so that they could compete favourably with foreign in
vestments,

To ease the domestic ills of unemployment, h o w 

ever, the government pleaded with the private entrepreneurs
to expand training of skilled personnel to include African
secondary school leavers.

It is contended that increased

personnel training would encourage rapid Africanization of
managerial life both in the public sector and in the busi
ness corporation.
In Tanzania, the political philosophy of African Soc
ialism is widely different from that of Kenya,

In an

10
Jomo Kenyatta,
Harambee! The Prime Minister of Kenya's
Speeches 1963-1964. London, Oxford University
Press, 1964, p, 76.

11
Ib i d , p, 79,
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attempt to provide a theoretical base for the government
planning of the economy, Julius Nyerere put forward the
12
idea of 'Ujamaa'
in 1962.
'Ujamaa' supposedly dramatizes
the socio-economic behaviour of Africans in the traditional
society,
'Ujamaa', then, or 'familyhood' describes our social
ism,
It is opposed to capitalism, which seeks to build a
happy society on the basis'"of the exploitation of man by
man;
and it is equally opposed to doctrinaire socialism
which seeks to build its happy society on a philosophy of
inevitable conflict between man and man,
13
In this notion, Nyerere tried to emphasize the communal
nature of the African society, where "nobody starved,
whether of food or human dignity, because he lacked per
sonal wealth;

he could depend on the wealth possessed by

the community of which he was a member.

That was socialism.

That is socialism,
Therefore, Nyerere exhorted his people to go back to
the traditional African custom of landholding whereby land
belonged to the community and the individual's "right to
land was simply the right to use it".

He further urged that

the capitalist attitude of mind which colonialism brought to
Africa, with its emphasis on individualism, must be reject12
Ujamaa is one of those Swahili words which cannot be
satisfactorily translated into English,
For present pur
poses, 'familyhood', 'brotherhood', or 'friendship' could
be substituted,
^^ Julius K, Nyerere,

Freedom and U n i t y , p, 170,

14
Ibid, p, l64.
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ed altogether,

Whether or not this tenacious clinging to

traditional values is conducive to modern economic develop
ment is debatable,

Nkrumah was probably correct when he

asserted that
Today the phrase 'African socialism' seems to espouse
the view that the traditional African society was a class
less society imbued with the spirit of humanism and to ex
press a nostalgia for that 'spirit,- Such a conception of
socialism makes a fetish of the communal African society.
Colonialism deserves to be blamed for many evils in Africa,
but surely it was not preceded by an African Golden Age or
paradise, A return to pre-colonial African society is
evidently not worthy of the ingenuity and efforts of our
people.
15
Here, it is interesting to note that Hkrumah and Nyerere
who often shared similar views and deep sentiments on many
aspects of African politics seem to be distinctly opposed
16
on the interpretation of African Socialism,
However, in his attempt to be practical and increase
the credibility of African socialism in relation to the
Tanzanian economy. President Nyerere instituted the selfreliance, socialist blueprint of the Arusha Declaration in
15
Kwame Nkrumah,
"African Socialism Revisited",
Fo r u m , Volume I, No, 3, 1966, pp, 4-5.

African

16
Also note the contradiction in the operational defini
tion of African Socialism between Kenyatta and Nyerere,
The concept of socialism is elusive in the African context.
It is hard to get consensus on what socialism means especi
ally when one compares the definition of left-wing African
nationalists with that of the moderates. But, with varying
shades of distinction and emphasis, theorists on African
socialism usually invoke African traditional life both as
the basis of the concept as well as the major factor which
distinguishes it from the European socialism.
See Kenneth
Grundy,
"The Class Struggle in Africa: An Examination of
Conflicting Theories",
Journal of Modern African Studies
Vol, 2, No, 3, November 1964, p, 379’
.
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1967.
ple,

The rationale for the inward-looking policy was sim
Tanzania as a poor country would have to raise itself

by its bootstraps and the operation would have to be based
largely on agricultural production.

Certain parts of the

money economy had been infiltrated by local, eminent poli
ticians who have used their offices to profit from foreign
»
investment and capitalism.
In accordance with the self-,
help philosophy, "mercenary politicians" would have to be
denied active participation in the government,

TAîIU offi

cials could not ovm or participate in business enterprises;
in other words, leaders could not receive more than one sal
ary,

Finally, self-reliance would replace expectation of

and dependence on foreign aid.

As expected, the Tanzanian

elites were cool towards this socialist and almost ascetic
doctrine.

It would seem as if President Nyerere was the

sole protagonist of the Declaration although the doctrine
has now received the official stamp of the government and
the TANU',

It could be assumed that Nyerere has succeeded

in convincing his people that the nature of Tanzania's ec
onomic ailment warranted such drastic surgery.
On his o w n , President Milton Obote of Uganda has been
too pre-occupied with establishing a firm domestic politi
cal base and prestige to give any philosophical depth to the
socio-economic relations of the Uganda people.

Therefore,

it is hard to give any fair appraisal of what he would call
African socialism.

All that can be said is that with a

liberal attitude to foreign investments and the capitalist
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attitudes of the elites, Milton Ohote would probably favour
an African socialism as defined by Jomo Kenyatta,

For ex

ample, in October 1967, the Ugandan Minister of Commerce
and Industry, Mr. Kalema, said that, "the government would
continue to allow private investors to operate alongside
government-owned organizations because we believe that in
Uganda, there is room for b'oth private and public invest17
ment".
Another basic value that pervades the political m a 
chinery of the East African countries is the "single party
system".

At independence, the same pattern of British par

liamentary democracy could be observed in all the countries.
But some years after, leaders began to put forth their ideas
and assessments of the two-party system.

The general atti

tude of the leaders could be summed up in Julius Nyerere's
remarks that:
Our cvm parties had a very different origin.
They
were not formed to challenge any ruling group of our own
people; .they were formed to challenge the foreigners who
ruled over us.
They were not, therefore, political "par
ties" - i,e, factions - but nationalist movements,
18
Here, it is necessary to remark that although the stabili
zing and most commonly the unifying role of the party is
indisputable in East Africa, yet the structure and ideo
logy of the parties are largely influenced by the leaders'
17
News in Brief, Africa Report, Vol, 12, No, 8, Nov, 1967,
p. 36,

18
Julius Nyerere, "Democracy and the Party System", The
Political Awakening of Afri c a, Martin Kilson,
(ed,). New Jersey, Prentice-Hall Inc. 1965, p,126
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colonial experiences and their evaluation of domestic needs.
In some instances the single-party system is an outgrowth and continuation of the mobilization of people and groups
that developed in the pre-independence period.

In many

cases, the single-party strategy is used by leaders to con
solidate their powers, the moreso since there is an obvious
interrelationship between the dominance of a single person
and the discipline, control and structure of party organi
zation,

So long as strong personal leadership continues,

mass loyalty would remain structured towards the single fi
gure rather than the party organization,
Kenya manifests rather peculiar characteristics of a
one party state.

In the early years of independence, Jomo

Kenyatta feared that the popular pressures that were muste
red against the colonial regime could be directed at him by
members of the opposition.

This is not difficult to illus

trate from events that followed the first election to the
Federal Assembly in February, 1 9 6 I, KANU won nineteen
19
seats to K A D U ’s
eleven, KANU refused to form a govern
ment as a protest to facilitate the release of Jomo Kenyatta
who had been in detention since the Mau Mau uprising.
colonial administration refused to be influenced.

The

Instead

it called on the KADU to form a minority government with

19
KADU is an abbreviation for Kenya African Democratic
Union which became the official opposition party after the
1 9 6 3 general elections.
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the support of some appointed European and Asian adminis
trators.

However, in the 19^3 elections, KANU won a great

er majority and Jomo Kenyatta was released to become the
Prime Minister.

Thus, at the time of independence in

December 1963, there were two parties in Kenya.
Consequently, Jomo Kenyatta was conscious of the
Opposition and the European force's in Kenyan politics.

He

would do nothing to aggravate race relations nor make spe
eches that could inflame violence from the tribally-based
KADU opposition.

Instead he appealed to

the Opposition to realize that we have a country to
build,,,.that we cannot develop by throwing mud in one
another's f ac e s ....whether people are KANU or KADU, and no
matter to what tribe they belong, the Government knows only
citizens,
20
But systematically and firmly, Kenyatta continued to conso
lidate influence and expanded his political base.

On

August 13, 1964 he announced that Kenya would henceforth
work towards a one-party State,

He explained that,

we reject a blueprint of the Western model of a twoparty system of Government, because we do not subscribe to
the notion of the Government and the governed being in op
position to one another, one clamouring for duties and the
other crying for rights,
21
In the same speech, Jomo Kenyatta argued that KADU was not
formed on a m a jority-rule concept but that the leaders of
the party were conceited, and unreliable politicians.

At

this stage Kenyatta guaranteed that a one-party state would

20
Jomo Kenyatta, Harambee!

p,8.

21
Ibid, p, 24,
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not usher in tyranny nor the deprivation of human rights.
KANU, the government party, would ensure freedom of speech,
of association and assembly.

KANU felt that Kenya could

not afford opposition just for the sake of opposition.
On November 10, 1964, Ronald Ngala, leader of the KADU
opposition party announced that all members of his parliam
entary group would henceforth work with the Government and
that KADU has been dissolved.

He concluded by paying glow

ing tributes to Kenyatta and expressed hopes that his ac
tion would accelerate detribalization and national unity.
Thus, from November 1964 to June 1966 Kenya was a defacto
and a de.lure one-party state.

However, in July 1966, Vice

President Oginga Odinga broke off from the KANU to form the
Kenya People's Union (KPU).

This was a culmination of an

intra-party feud involving Tom Mboya over a contest for
leadership.

Even then and after, Odinga's party did not

offset the predominance of the KANU party in Kenya's pol
itics.
In Tanganyika, the one-party system was a result of
Nyerere's careful planning.

He had earlier propounded that

young nations which "emerge as a result of a nationalist
movement should first be governed by a nationalist govern-

22
ment rather than a party government",

Nyerere's conten

tion was that the unity achieved during the struggles
against colonialism was fragile and not strong enough to

22
Helen Kitchen,

A Handbook of African Affairs,
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withstand the stresses of nation building.
should be consolidated.

This unity

The desire to institutionalize

unity consequently found expression in the one-party sys
tem,

Two-party politics was considered dangerous especial

l y in a multi-tribal society like Tanganyika,

But Nyerere ^

was careful to distinguish the Tanganyikan single party
prescription from other forms such as those that operate
in the Communist countries.

He thought that if membership

were open to all and the single party were democratic, m i 
nority opinion could be heard without intimidation.

At the time of independence, TANU was already a mass
movement and the de facto single party in Tanganyika,

It

was hierarchically organized and led by a charismatic lea
der,

It faced no organized interest groups and the posi

tion of the leaders was secure.

But after Nyerere and

other top echelons of the Party had been absorbed into the
Government in 1961, TANU organization became weakened,
Nyerere had to step down as Prime Minister in order to re
vitalize and reorganize it.

In this process TAIUJ member

ship was extended to everybody, African, non-African, civilServants or bureaucrats living in Tanganyika who could af
ford to pay the two-shilling entrance fee,

Grassroot par

ty organizations were strengthened and by the time Julius
Nyerere returned to the government in 1962, he was in full
control of both government and party administration.

How

ever, it was not until 1964 that formal steps were taken
for the establishment of a Constitution to make Tanganyika
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a de jure One-Party state.

On January 28, 1964, a Presiden

tial Commission was appointed under the chairmanship of
Vice-President Rashidi Kawawa
to consider what changes were necessary in the consti
tution of Tanganyika and the Constitution of TANU, as well
as in the practices of government, in order tobring into
effect a democratic one-party state,
23
The Commission invited public comment on a large number of
*

party, government, leadership and administrative issues and
came out with its Report in March 1965.

Besides constitu

ting the basis for the Interim Constitution of the United
Republic of Tanzania of July 1965, the Report
accepted that the One-Party State would be a reflec
tion of political reality in Tanzania and that its formal
ization would be designed to perpetuate that reality into
the future, and with it the political stability that was
regarded as its product,
24
The Interim Constitution that was passed by Act 43 of 1965
further elevated the Party as the "institutionalized organ
of the State subject to the same controls and scrutiny of
25
the Cabinet, Parliament or the Civil Service",
No doubt
the organizational inheritance of the pre-independence
period, lack of organized opposition, the ingenuity of

23
William Tordoff,
Government and Politics in Tanzania,
Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1967, p.2,
Also see Tanganyika Gazette, 7.2,64,
General No
tice no.300,
24
J, P, W. B, McAuslan,
"Political Stability and Consttitutional Innovation in Tanzania", The World
Today, December 1966, Vol, 22, No, 12, p, 537.
25
Colin Degum, "Single-Party Democracy?", The World Tod ay ,
December 1965, Vol, 21, No, 12, p, 527,
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Nyerere and the social environment in Tanganyika had con
tributed immensely to the predominance of the TANU party
in present-day Tanzania.
But of the three East African countries, none has
found it more difficult to attain the one-party status than
Uganda.

The competitive leadership, the Bugandan parochia

lism, the complicated federal structure and the position of
the traditionalist Kabaka Yekka (KY) party made the road to
the one-party system very long and arduous.

Milton Obote

therefore chose to be pragmatic rather than overtly ideolo
gical,

But in spite of the caution, the single-party state

offered an attraction.

The attraction was reinforced by

the obstructionist politics of the K Y party, the separatist
policy of the Kabaka and predominance of the Baganda that
arose from the constitutional status guaranteed to Buganda
during the pre-independence negotiation.

This privileged

"legal position of Buganda in the Uganda Constitution (1962)
represented the solid achievement of Buganda's negotiating
strength, and, until the events of November 1964 after the
referendum on the lost counties, it suggested that the
Kabaka's Government could effectively insulate Buganda and
26
preserve its constitutional rights by litigation,"
In the April 1962 general elections Milton Obote's
Uganda Peoples Party won thirty-seven of the ninety-one

26
J, M, Lee,

"Buganda's Position in Federal Uganda",
Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies,
Volume III, 1965, ed, Kenneth Robinson and
¥, Morris Jones, p, 1 6 5 ,
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seats in Parliament,

The other seats were won hy the K a b a 

k a Yekka Party with twenty-one and the Democratic Party with
twenty-four,

A coalition government between the Uganda

Peoples Congress (UPC) and the K Y was formed under Prime
Minister Obote,

Some years after the coalition government

was formed, there grew evidences of its imminent collapse.
By December 1963, forty-eight of the ninety-one deputies
in parliament were committed to the UPC,

Further defect

ions from both K Y and the DP greatly strengthened the po
sition of the UPC at the expense of the Buganda-based KY
Party,
While this means that the UPC could now technically
govern without Kabaka Yekka*s support, Mr, Obote apparent
l y feels that it is safer politically to keep the creaky
alliance functioning and avoid a premature polarization
27
between the progressives and neotraditionalists in Buganda,
Meanwhile, Obote permitted constitutional debates on wheth
er Uganda should adopt a unitary or a strong central govern
ment in place of the existing loose federation.

By the

time the coalition government broke dotm in December 1964,
Mr, Obote had already made a statement which outlined the
future of Uganda in terms of a single-party system.

In a

major policy address to a local meeting of the UPC in Lango
(Northern Uganda) in 1964, he assailed
the factional and tribal groupings which inevitably
divide our endeavour to build national consciousness and
embark on the Socialist construction of our society,,,I
am firmly convinced that a one-party state does not ine-

27
Helen Kitchen,

A Handbook of African Affairs, p, 172,
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vitably and necessarily remove the opportunity of giving
voice to the expression of individual opinion and the giv
ing of constructive criticism,,.Socialist principles must
guide, inform and govern the basis, form and content of all
Institutions of our society.
28
By then, the UPC had in fact secured control of all elec
ted assemblies in federal states and districts outside Bu
ganda, some by electoral victories, others by defections
from the DP.

»

However, Buganda did not leave Obote's growing powers
unchallenged.
in Kampala,

Early in 1966, violent disruptions broke out
Obote took stiff action, created emergency po

wers, muzzled the opposition, deposed the Kabaka and assu
med full control of the government activities.

In Septem

ber 1 9 6 7 , Uganda was proclaimed a Republic and the third
Constitution after independence was imposed.

Under it,

Obote became the President of a unitary state and the long
aspiration to build a strong, unified, republican state be
came almost a reality.

In this turn of events, the UPC

became the dominant party in the state,
Prom the foregoing discussion on factors affecting do
mestic policy in East Africa, one can identify freedom,
unity and economic survival as the major and all-pervading
themes that concern the leaders.

As Jomo Kenyatta once put

it
all the noble Charters and Declarations of history and
all the Constitutions that enshrine human rights have sprung
from one paramount truth;
that men in their spirit and in
28

News in Brief, African Report, Vol, 9, No, 2, February
1964, p, 21,
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their striving, under the law, have the right to be free,29
Because of their colonial experience, the three leaders
(Obote, Kenyatta and Nyerere) believe that freedom and un
ity are necessary conditions for the attainment of other
goals.

They think that, "a house divided against itself

would not stand".

They fear communal violence.

to preserve peace, order and good government,

They want
Jomo Kenyatta

still remembers the intrigues that surrounded the Mau Mau
uprisings of the 1950*s.

As the central figure,

jailed

rightly or wrongly for having masterminded the eruption,
he is apprehensive of public reactions to bad policies.
Similarly, the mutiny of the two battalions of the Tanga
nyikan Army against their British officers in January 1964,
and the outbreak of riots and tribal hostilities at Kampala
in 1964 and 1966 are vivid illustrations of how easily
public order could break d o w n ,

Therefore, all the leaders

are concerned about ways and means to improve communications,
suppress tribal sentiments and cement national unity.

This

is one reason why all the leaders (with varying intensity
and methods) prefer a single-party system.

This is why the

two-party system is rejected and rationalized as a luxury.
Opposition parties have also been denounced as saboteurs
while the position of the ruling parties has been enhanced.
Economically, the three East African governments have

9
Jomo Kenyatta,

Harambee! p, 1,
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been promoting programmes of development specially attuned
to their interpretation of African socialism.

Consequently,

Socialism has become the a priori solution to economic ills.
But the extent to which economic factors actually influence
both domestic and foreign policies cannot easily be explain
ed as some Marxists or other economic determinists may pos
tulate.

In some cases, economic considerations seem to be

as important as the freedom and unity theme.

In other

cases economic factors seem to have played a subordinate
role as it appears to be in Tanzania's refusal of aid from
West Germany and the rejection of the #21 m, loan from
.30
Britain over the Rhodesian issue.
However, in both
Uganda and Kenya where economic structure depends on for
eign interests, the governments have tried to establish a
"countervailing power" in order to ensure a more equitable
distribution of national wealth.

Both governments have

adopted a creeping Africanization policy with a view to
creating more job and business opportunities for the native
Africans.

For example, in April 1965, the Kenyan Minister

for Commerce and Industry urged non-African businessmen to
identify themselves with African aspirations by inviting
Africans to buy shares in their enterprises.

Minister

Kiano said "while we do not discriminate against nonAfricsns in Kenya, the spirit of give and take should pre-

30
Circumstances surrounding Tanzania's action will be
explained later in the thesis.
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.

31

vail".

Currently, both the Ugandan and the Kenyan gov

ernments are selective in their issuing of business per
mits to their Asians with British passports.

It would

appear that both governments are not only advocating the
operation of African Socialism as such but the Africaniza
tion of capitalism as well.

According to Jomo Kenyatta;

The purpose of our Africanization programme is simple;
to maintain an efficient and effective machine of Govern
ment by and for Kenya's people,...We need at many levels not
only talent and loyalty, but also experience.
This is why
training schemes have been instituted, and must be continued;
to equip our poeple for posts of high responsibility, and
give them opportunity to gain the maturity that comes from
experience, 32
Finally, it should be remembered that in East Africa, in
dependence was the result of successful nationalist revo
lutions,

The colonial administration was accused of eco

nomic exploitation and blamed for the slow rate of social
transformation of the Africans,

Conscious of their tasks

to eradicate diseases, poor nutrition and illiteracy, the
three governments have embarked upon various projects in
tended to expedite modernization.

But modernization cannot

be defined in exclusively Western values.

For image and

cultural reasons, the East African governments are select
ive about the import of modernization "appearances" which
seem to conflict with their criteria of ethics and tradi-

31
All A, Mazrui,
"Borrowed Theory and Original Practice
in African Politics",
Patterns of African Develop
ment , Herbert J, Spiro ed. New Jersey, PrenticeHall, Inc., 1 9 6 7 , p, 1 1 8 ,
32
Jomo Kenyatta,

Harambee! p, 3.
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tional values.

As evidenced in the new slogans of "African

personality", contemporary East African nationalism seeks to
display the social and cultural uniqueness of the people
to the rest of the world. Mini-skirts are banned in Uganda
33
and frowned at in Kenya,
Tanzania has recently published
her "cultural revolution" policy.

It rejects not only rad-

ical Western dressing but outlaws the primitive culture of
the Masais,

Similarly, Nyerere defies capitalism because

of its emphasis on materialism and its distortion of the
egalitarian principles of African Society,

Conversely,

Jomo Kenyatta and Milton Obote have embraced capitalism
with qualifications.

For them, there is nothing inherently

bad in it under governmental control and supervision,
Kenyatta believes that mutual social responsibility con
ceives of the state as a means by which self-interest is
harmonized with the general welfare.

But generally, all

the leaders believe that Africaness should not be sacrifi
ced for political modernization or economic development.
For them, modernization should blend, not destroy African
identity, traditional values and culture.

33
In a recent debate on cultural nationalism Senator
Kabaso said in the Kenya Parliament that "Our ministers
are the worst offenders.
They are the policymakers who
preach African socialism, yet their women have hair that
looks like sisal," Another Kenya politician, G, Kariuki
(KANU) declared that wearing of a miniskirt was "just like
a woman advertising herself, and this is very unfair and
we cannot tolerate this in our African socialism,"
See
Ali A, Mazrui, "Miniskirts and Political Puritanism",
Africa Report, Vol, 13, No,7, Oct, 1968, p, 12,
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Considering these attempts of leaders to integrate
political modernization with tradition, one can see the
inter-relationship between domestic and foreign policies.
For the decision-makers both foreign and domestic policies
should enhance the ideals and fruits of independence.
Unity, political stability, economic developments and seh
curity are the basics of domestic policy. Foreign policy
is a logical extension and tool for achieving the ends.
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"CHAPTER THREE
EAST AFRICAN FEDERATION AND PAN-AFRICANISM

From Tangier or Cairo in the North to Capetown in
the South, from Cape Guardafui in the East to Cape
Verde Islands in the West, Africa is one and in
divisible.
- Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Uni t e, p. 127.
tPAN-AFRICANISM AND THE O.A.U.
The concept of pan-Africanism is almost universally ac
cepted among African leaders, but its potential lies more
in the ideal it expresses than in its practicability.

As

an ideal, it is capable of bringing together many leaders
wh o embrace conflicting views on almost every issue facing
Africa.
ions.

Pan-Africanism has many aspects and interpretat
The most consistent theme that runs through the lit

erature on the subject seems to be the general concern
among African leaders that some form of co-operation is
necessary to insure the economic development, decoloniza
tion and political stability of African states.
In the early 196o’s, it was rare for most African lea
ders to make a speech of any importance without touching
upon the theme of African unity.
romanticized.

Pan-Africanism became

It sought to glorify the African mystique

of unity and brotherhood.

Some leaders propounded theories

about the necessity of unity.

Even with the rapid achie

vement of independence among African States in I960, the
struggle for unification was intensified;

yet there was

-43
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no consensus on the ideal pan-Africanism.

For some leaders

pan-Afrioanism meant a total political unity of all indep
endent African states;

for others it was a desire for

functional cooperation on such matters as economic develop
ment and communication.

For example, the All-African

People's Conference which met in Accra, Ghana in 1958 under
»
Tom Mboya of Kenya resolved that:
Pan-Africanism calls for the amalgamation of indepen
dent African states into regional federations or groupings
on the basis of geographical contiguity, economic inter
dependence, and linguistic and cultural affinity, with the
caveat, however, that the establishment of such regional
federations should not be prejudicial to the ultimate ob
jective of a Pan-African Commonwealth. 1
For President Julius Kyerere of Tanganyika pan-Africanism
meant a political federation of all African states.

In

1 9 6 3 , he contended that Africa unity was necessary pre

requisite for survival.

He went on:

For the sake of all African states, large or small,
African Unity must come and it must be real unity.
Our
goal must be a United States of Africa.
Only this can
really give Africa the future her people deserve after
centuries of economic uncertainty and social oppression.
This goal must be achieved and it does not matter whether
this is done by one step or by many, or through economic,
political or social development.
2
However, in May,

1963 leaders of twenty-eight African coun

tries met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia to find a more coherent
definition of pan-Africanism.

In a long debate about

whether or not African countries should adopt a monolithic.
1
David K. Marvin,
Emerging Africa in World Affairs, Cal
ifornia, Chandler Publishing Company, Ï9 6 5 , p.73.

2

Julius K. Nyerere,

Freedom and U n i t y , p. I8 9 .
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political amalgamation, Prime Minister Obote of Uganda
spoke in favour of Ghana's proposal for a "strong execu3
tive, central government with effective powers".
Kenya,
still a British colony, was represented by Oginga Odinga,
who was also a representative for the twenty-one nationa
list parties in dependent states of Africa.
»
oured a political unity of African states.

He also fav-

On May 25» the twenty-eight leaders signed the Charter
of the Organization of African Unity.
sented,

The Charter repre

"a compromise between radically differing views of

African unity, between those who thought of African unity
as a symbolic and tactical aspect of a revolutionary move
ment and those who thought of it as an alliance between
sovereign states to protect their newly acquired status in
4
the world community."
Among other things, the Charter
recognized the territorial integrity of each independent,
sovereign, member state, condemned outside interference in
thé internal affairs of states and emphasized the need for
greater understanding and cooperation among the members.
The Charter also expressed the desire for rapid decoloni
zation in Africa and condemned racial discrimination in
South Africa.

3
The Africa Institute of International Bulletin, V o l. 1,
Ho.' 6, July 1 9 6 3 , p. 153.
4
Immanuel Hallerstein,
"The Early Years of the GAU",
International Organization,
Volume XX, Ap. 1966,
p. 7 7 4 .
^
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During the Summit meeting, Oginga Odinga, the VicePresident of the Kenya African National Union, read a me 
morandum urging that an African Liberation Bureau be set
up in the capital of an independent African country for the
purpose of coordinating the liberation struggles of the de
pendent states in Africa.

He also recommended that the

Conference issue "an ultimatum to all colonial and racist
powers in Africa to start immediately, the transference of
power to the African peoples in the denendent territories,
„ 5
or else face the consequences .
This theme was echoed by
President Hyerere.

As the last head of state to address

the Conference, he summarized his feelings on pan-Africa
nism and the need for rapid decolonization in Africa.
In order then to complete this picture of unanimity,
let me add Tanganyika's voice....At present, not because
of any greater dedication to the cause of freedom in
Africa, but because of that proximity to non-independent
Africa, we are already making a humble contribution to the
liberation of Southern Africa, but we are prepared to do
more....I want to assure our gallant brother from Algeria,
Prime Minister Ben Bella, that we in Tanganyika are pre
pared to die a little for the final removal of the humi
liation of colonialism from the face of Africa.
6
Thus, by the end of the Summit Conference at Addis Ababa in
1 9 6 3 , pan-Africanism assumed two more distinct forms.

First,

as a means of preserving the newly won independence, the
Charter ensures respect for sovereignty and territorial

5
Op. c i t ., p. 1 5 8 .

6
Julius K. Hyerere,

Freedom and U n i t y , p. 215.
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integrity of member-states.

Second, as a means to combat

colonialism and imperialism, the Summit called for rapid
transference of powers to the dependent territories.

It

also pledged specific sums of money and military equipment,
to nationalist movements through the Liberation Coordinat
ing Committee.

It is significant to note that the East

African leaders who formerly favoured African unity in
terms of political amalgamation also came out strongly in
favour of rapid decolonization.

Milton Obote even tried to

demonstrate his support for liberation forces by offering
his country as a base for nationalist movements against
South Africa, Angola, Mozambique and Ehodesia.
that, "if the latter country (Southern Rhodesia)

He said
should suc

ceed in obtaining independence with a white minority govern
ment all independent African States should break off diplo
matic relations with the United Kingdom and her fellow-tra7
vellers."
Consequently, from the activities of the East

The Africa Institute of International Bulletin, V o l . 1,
Ho. 6, July 1 9 6 3 , p. 1 5 9 .
However, it is interesting to note that when, on November
11» 1 9 6 5 , Ian Smith unilaterally declared Rhodesia inde- •
pendence, only Tanzania of the three East African States
honoured her pledge to sever diplomatic relations with
Britain.
The extra-ordinary GAU meeting of December 3»
1 965 had adopted a strong resolution in favour of this
action if Britain failed to crush the Smith Government
by December 15.
Other countries which severed relations,
with Britain were:
Guinea, Ghana, UAR, Mali, Mauritania,
Congo-Brazzaville, Sudan, Algeria and Somalia. Uganda,
which was the first country to recommend severing of di
plomatic relations with Britain as a measure of protest
against the minority government in Rhodesia, clearly
failed to honour her pledge.
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African States at the first O.A.Ü. Conference at Addis
Ababa,

it would appear that there was a shift in emphasis

from outright political unity of independent African states
to total emancipation of the dependent territories.
THE EAST AFRICAN FEDERATION
On June 3, 1963, Prime Ministers Kenyatta and Obote
and President Nyerere jointly declared their intention to
establish a federation by the end of the year.

In their

communique at Nairobi, they declared that:
Our meeting is motivated by the spirit of PanAfricanism and not by mere selfish Regional
interests... We believe that the East African
Federation can be a practical step towards the
goal of Pan-African Unity.°
Simultaneously, a timetable was established and a Working
Party was set up to draft a Federal Constitution.

On

July 31, 1 9 6 3 , Jomo Kenyatta expressed the need for fede
ration when he said that:
This matter of the Federation is particularly
important to us here in East Africa.
We do
not want to be separated from our brethren by
artificial frontiers, created at the time of
Colonialism... We want to move towards that
unity of the East African people in good order
and with our administrative machinery geared
to the great task a h e a d . 9
However, it is questionable whether there was a genuine
political commitment on the parts of Kenyatta and Obote

^

See the complete text of the Communique in Appendix 1 .

^

Jomo Kenyatta, Harambee !. p. 28.
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towards an East African Federation.

In fact, a case can

be made that appeals to Pan-Africanism and the Declaration
to federate were being used to procure K e n ya ’s indepen
dence.

Kenya was a British colony at the time the Nairobi

Declaration was signed.

An appeal was dispatched to
*

Britain that:

We must declare most strongly our opposition
to any attempt to delay the country's achieve
ment of Independence any longer ... We must
regard it as an unfriendly act if Britain
uses the pretext of some minority interest
or other to prevent Kenya joining the free
nations at the earliest possible moment.
We
are closely involved in this matter now
since a hold-up in K e n y a ’s advance to
Independence will hinder the achievement of
Federation to which we are committed.10

Soon after the first meeting of the Working Party, Mr. Tom
Mboya headed a delegation to press the Kenyan demands in
London.

The delegation met with Mr, Duncan Sandys, the

Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and for the
Colonies., As a result of the meeting, K e n y a ’s independence
was set for December 12, 1963.

In Mr. Sandys’ report to the

10
Op.cit., Appendix 1
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British House of Commons, he said that the decision of the
East African States to federate was, "an important new deve
lopment ... .which has to be taken into account in the tim11

ing of K e n y a ’s independence."

He went on that the East

African Governments had affirmed their intention to esta
blish a federation before the end of the year and had al
ready "made substantial progress in working out the cons
titution",

He concluded that it was "in the light of these

considerations" that such an early date had been set for
K e n y a ’s independence.
If the Nairobi Declaration were assessed from the
point of view of Kenyan decolonization, then, it could be
assumed that pan-Africanist ideals had been used to advan
tage.

That the Declaration to federate was a strategy

primarily intended to procure K e n y a ’s independence could
also be inferred from Prime Minister Obote's speech to the
backbenchers' conference in May 1964.

Explaining the un

willingness of Uganda to enter into a political federation
with other East African States, he said, "the idea of
Federation had been put forward as an argument to speed
Kenya's independence....the first objective of the Nairobi
meeting was to achieve Kenya's independence....regardless

11
J. H. Proctor, Jr., "The Effort To Federate East Africa;
A Post-Mortem",
Political Quarterly, Vol. 37, 1966,
p. 67.
Also see Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Britain,
July 2, 1 9 6 3 , Vol. 6 8 0 , Ool. 201 or Jomo Keny at ta ,
Harambee! p. 28,
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of what people today are alleging."

51
Jomo Kenyatta seemed

to support this view in his speech at Kisumu Hyansa on
August 2, 1964 when he said that the Declaration of East
African Federation was intended to lure the British Govern13
ment to decolonize Kenya,
However, President Nyerere,
apparently unimpressed with the interpretations of Prime
Ministers Obote and Kenyatta, said in Dar-es-Salaam in
August 1964, that he had signed the Nairobi Declaration,
"in all honesty, believing that federation was genuinely
14
wanted."
But assuming that Prime Ministers Kenyatta and
Obote were right, could the "diplomacy of independence" be
the only motivation for proposals of the East African
Federation?

In the Nairobi Declaration, for example, it

was mentioned that, "an important factor in view of our
determination to achieve Federation is the existence of a
shared currency, a leading aspect of economic working to
gether is the functioning of the E.A. Common Market".
The Common Market Organization itself was an economic
institution that was established by the colonial powers in
1948.

It was intended to be a first step towards political

integration.

It operated under a permanent executive au-

12
■ Uganda A r gu s, Kampala, June 27, 1964.
13
News in Brief, Africa Report, Vol. 9, No. 9, October
1964, p. 24. Also see All A. Mazrui, "Tanzania
versus East Africa",
Journal of Commonwealth
Political Studies, Vol'. Ill, 1965, p. 2Ï 3.
14
Tanganyika Standards, Dar-es-Salaam, August 4, 1964.
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thority called the East Africa High Commission,

The High

Commission was composed of the Governors of the three East
African territories.

A Secretariat consisting of the Ad

ministrator, Legal and Financial Secretaries, the Post
master General and the Commissioner for Transport was esta
blished in Nairobi.

The immediate goal of the Common Market

Organization was the promotion of a high degree of economic
integration i.e. the elimination of duplication in adminis
tration and of competition in such matters as railway, pos
tal services, the facilitation of labour mobility and the
adoption of a common currency and a common market.
After some years, the Organization became the subject
of frequent criticisms.

Its' critics contended that the

Organization was specially created to benefit the Kenya
Europeans.

So vigorous and disturbing were the criticisms

that Sir Jeremy Haisman was appointed to head a Commission
to investigate the complaints in 1 9 6 0 .

In its report, the

Commission recommended the "creation of a common pool of
income to compensate Uganda and Tanganyika for the revenues
and employment benefits these two territories customarily
lose through the tendency of new industry to locate near

15
existing industry - i.e. in Kenya."

The 1 9 6 I recommend

ations of the Saisman Commission led to the establishment

15
Nye, J.3. Jr., "From Common Market to Federation",
Africa Report, Vol. 8, No. 8, August
1 9 6 3 , p. 5 ,
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of the Distributable Pool Fund to serve two purposes;

"one

was that of providing an independent source of revenue for
the common services;

the other was to provide a fiscal re16
distribution between the territories."
"When Tanganyika became independent on December 9, 1961,

there was need for a revitalization of the Common Market
Organization.

The executive authority of the East African

Common Services Organization (EASCO as it was then called)
passed to the Chief Ministers of the territories.

Four

ministerial committees were established in charge of Com
munications, Finance, Commercial and Industrial Co-ordina
tion, Social and Research Services.

Like the former Common

Market Organization the EASCO was not entirely satisfactory
and instead of its projected unifying role it served as a
medium of dissension.

Soon after its formation, disputes

arose over equity - distribution of funds and allocation
of faculties among the three colleges comprising the Uni
versity of East Africa,

In February 1963, Uganda decided

to.withdraw from the East African Tourist Travel Associa
tion because of alleged disparities.

Efforts to achieve

free movement of capital and labour for the realization
of full benefits from the customs union were already being
hampered by technical difficulties.
Similarly, there has been reluctance to accept the
principle that capital generated in one country should be

T6--------Hazlewood, A., African Integration and Disintegration,
London, Oxford University Press 1967, p. 72.
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.

able to move freely within the common market area.
A
Ugandan who announced his intention to invest in Kenya
early this year ran into severe difficulties with his
own government.17
Stresses within the common market became more serious
as industries and commercial activity congregated increa-,
singly around Nairobi thereby making Uganda and Tanganyika
equalizing factors seemed to illustrate an imminent col
lapse of the E.A.S.C.O. and although the Organization it
self may have been advantageous

to the region as a whole

Tanzania and Uganda were getting disenchanted.

Perhaps an

abandonment of the E.A.S.C.O. would have been more logical
than its continuation but the leaders, particularly Presi
dent Nyerere probably thought that a political union and a
better organized, central economic planning would redress
the imbalance in the Organization.

Therefore, the Nairobi

Declaration was timely, for the idea of East African
Federation could be used to de-emphasize regional disparities
and marshal greater co-operation.
Now, why did the East African leaders fail to agree
despite the fact that after the first meeting of the
Working Party for Federal Constitution, the Kenyan Minister
of Justice, Tom Mboya told reporters that "agreements had
1R
been reached on every issue".'
given.

Four broad reasons can be

Firstly, the leaders of the three states appear

to have had various degrees of commitment to the federation

17
Op.cit ., p. 6.

18
Tanganyika Standard. (Dar-es-Salaam), June 11, 1963.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

55
idea.

Prime Ministers Obote and Kenyatta seem to have

put their priorities on Kenyan independence and, there
fore, regarded the Nairobi Declaration as a form of diplo
macy to achieve this goal.

President Nyerere seems to

have upheld a different idea.

For him the creation of

the East African Federation was the most essential purpose of the Nairobi Declaration.
Secondly, constitutional problems began to arise in
Kampala on June 29, 1963.

The Ugandan representative in

the Working Party, Mr. Nekyon, who was also the Minister
of Information in his government, gave a formidable list
of matters, "on which agreement had still to be reached the Civil Service, the selection of a federal capital,
the number of chambers in the federal legislature and
the powers they should have, citizenship, the division
of powers between the federal and state governments with
respect to foreign affairs, minerals and agriculture and
whether residual powers should belong to the federal
government or the states".19
On citizenship, for example, Uganda proposed that
the East African citizenship be conferred on all citizens
of the three territories should not become the citizen
of another; in other words.

19
Colin Leys and Peter Robson, Federation in East Africa;
Opportunities and Problems. London, Oxford
University Press, 1965, p. 2.
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East African citizenship was to be merely an expression of
a loose federation.

Kenya and Tanganyika maintained that

citizenship should be an all-pervading, common denominator
that would guarantee equal status to every subject irres
pective of residence.

Citizenship and foreign affairs were

held to be so essential to federation that Minister Kambona
of Tanganyika said, "without these powers, there can be no

20
question of a genuine political association".

Uganda den

ied this and charged others with being too presumptuous in
assuming that "there is a standard model which must be fol21
lowed in all cases".
Uganda's determination to retain
power over external relations was also argued with refer
ence to the already established membership of the inter
national community and the OAU.

Since these Organizations

recognize the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
member states, Uganda argued that "East Africa's strongest
weapon in international affairs is its three separate votes

22
and voices in the United Nations'-.

Kenya and Tanganyika

rejected these arguments on the ground that federation would
be meaningless without federal control over citizenship and
foreign affairs.

20
Government Statement on the East African Federation,
United Republic of Tanzania Official Report, June 1,
1964, col. 3461
21

A. Nekyon,
Uganda National Assembly, Official Report,
June 26, 1964, cols. 1933, 1939-1946.

22

Ibid, col. 1937.
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• Thirdly, domestic pressures and personality conflicts
aroused distrust among the leaders.

In Uganda, the trad

itionalist Buganda and the Kabaka wanted to keep their pri
vileged status and did not want to be assimilated into any
other federal structure besides Uganda's.

In fact, a re

solution had been passed as far back as January 26, 1963 in
the Lukiko,

(regional legislature) opposing any other pol

itical union.
Five days after the Nairobi Declaration, a closed ses
sion of the Lukiko was presented by the Kabaka's Cabinet
with a statement of policy which viewed East African Fede
ration with favour on condition that Buganda be one of its
constituent units.
This was said to be necessary to gua
rantee the future not only of its monarchy and other trad
itional institutions but also of its very identity.
23
As the Ugandan Federal Government was most unwilling to
accept the Kabaka's terms, Obote felt compelled to be cau
tious on negotiations about the East African Federation.
Similarly, in Kenya, the Kikuyu and the Luo predominant,
ethnic groups wanted to enter into the federation as sep
arate, constituent units.
KADU opposition party.

They were being supported by the

On June 17, 1964, Jomo Kenyatta told

the House of Representatives that, "if it was not for a
KADU nuisance, we would have federated a long time ago....
If it was not for the introduction of majimbo* by KADU,

23
J. H. Proctor, Jr.,
"The Effort to Federate East Africa",
Political Quarterly, Volume 37, 1966, p. 62.
*

Hajimbo is a Swahili word for provincialism or regional
ism or tribalism.
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the Federation would have been much easier".

But, apart

from tribal feelings, there were indications of acrimony and
silent distrust among the various leaders over the race for
top posts in the proposed federation.

Even some of the

junior leaders were reported to be apprehensive of their
chances and status if the federation should materialize.
However, the accusation of personal aggrandizement should
be directed to the three heads of Government who were more
disposed to contest for the highest posts in the federation.
According to J.H. Proctor,
Neither Dr. Nyerere nor Mr. Kenyatta was invulnerable
to such accusations, for the former was an ardent federal
ist and the latter was certain to be offered the top posi
tion in the Federal Government.
The reluctance of Dr.
Obote was said by some to be due to his awareness that he
would be doomed to a distinctly secondary position at the
federal level since the other two Heads of Government so
clearly surpassed him in s t a t u r e . ?
When for example, Mr. A. Nekyon expressed the opinion in
September 1963 that federation would be "practically imp
ossible"

before the end of the year the Financial Times

correspondent in Nairobi wrote that;
Mr. Nekyo n’s statement appears to be a bargaining
counter rather than a serious threat.
But it has brought
to light the rivalries and fears that plague Uganda's re
lationship with Kenya both nationally and personally.
Now
that more of the implications of federation are known,
there is a real fear in Uganda of domination by Kenya. 26

24

Kenyatta, Kenya House of Representatives. Official
Report, June 17. 1964. Cols. 269-271. or see
Jomo Kenyatta, Harambee I. p. 31.

25

J.H. Proctor, Jr., Political Quarterly, op. cit., p. 61.

26

New in Brief, Africa Report, vol. 8, No. 9, October 1963,
p. 20.
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Fourthly, the time factor may have become one of the
greatest obstacles to federation.

As President Nyerere

prophesied shortly before the Nairobi Declaration, "time
may well not be on the side of federation".
The fact is that there is the right moment for
everything, and the right moment for unity is
certainly not after the achievement of separate
sovereign independence.
If separate indepen
dence is inevitable we should certainly not
give up trying, but it is going to be much
harder task to unite our c o u n t r i e s . 27
Nyerere was under no illusion of how difficult negotiations
could be except before all the three countries achieved
independence.

Both Uganda and Tanganyika were sovereign

states when the Nairobi Declaration was made in 1963.

As

a historian, Nyerere had learnt that federations designed
from previously independent and sovereign units had never
I
really been easy, except those built under an extremely
powerful force.

It could hardly be anticipated that force

would ever be used to impose federation in East Africa.
The structure of power, the ostensible pacifist policies
of the three leaders, the diversities in population and
poor logistics inevitably make negotiation as opposed
to confrontation the only vehicle for integration.
Nyerere*s prophesy was right after all.

When Mr. A.

Nekyon was giving the report of the Working Party to the
Uganda National Assembly in July 1963, he said:
We are negotiating now as independent states and
when we sit at the conference table we talk as
if we are talking at Geneva on disarmament.
We

27
Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom ani U n i t y , p. 98.
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are not talking on friendly terms as relations or
as clans, but we are speaking as different states
discussing their own future... We appreciate we
are brothers but we will do everything in our
power to see that Uganda gsts her due share irres
pective of our relations.2°
In addition to the above reasons for the failure of the
leaders to federate East Africa, one other factor deserves
to be mentioned, though it is difficult to assess its actual
significance.

There were alleged to be external forces

opposed to federation.

The allegations have not been ade

quately substantiated but on June 23, 1964, The Nationalist
paper (Nairobi) accused the United States and Britain of
sabotage in the materialization of the East African fede
ration.

The paper contended that an East African federation

would hasten the liquidation of white rule in Rhodesia and
Mozambique against Western interest.
Gichuru,

Similarly, Mr. J.S.

the Kenyan Minister of Finance said that, "it

was these outside influences which got in our way.

If we

had been left alone, I am quite sure we would have done
much more up to this m o m e n t " . H o w e v e r ,

it is difficult

to admit the above allegations of external subversion since
Britain earlier granted Kenyan independence as a mark of
support for the proposed federation.
While there has been lack of evidence to support the
alleged Anglo-American subversion, there is evidence of
continental disapproval especially from Ghana.

28
29

Uganda National Assembly.
C o 1,~ÏÔ46.

Nkrumah's

Official Report. July 12, 1963,

EasU African Common Services Organization, Proceedings of
the Central Legislative Assembly Debates. Nairobi, January
16, 1964, Col. 1428.
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lofty ideas of pan-Africanism did not admit of regional
integration as proposed by the East African leaders.

In

his book on Africa Must U ni t e , he wrote in particular
reference to the federation that:
In order to improve effectively and quickly
the serious damage done to Africa as a result
of imperialism and colonialism, the emergent
African States need strong, unitary states
capable of exercising a central authority for
the mobilization of the regional effort and
the co-ordination of reconstruction and progress.
For this reason, I consider that even the idea of
regional federations in Africa is fraught with
many dangers.
There is the danger of the develop
ment of regional loyalties fighting against each
other.
In effect, regional federations are a
form of balkanization on a grand s c a l e . 30
Nkrumah's disapproval of the East African federation was
also expressed with charges of a neo-colonialist plot inten
ding to perpetuate Western hegemony in Africa.

Consequently,

efforts to federate in East Africa were bitterly attacked
by the Government-controlled newspapers in Accra while the
"Ghanaian officials in East Africa engaged in an unrestrained
public diplomatic offensive as well as clandestine lobbying
against the project".31
No w it seems that economic and social forces are not
automatically leading to political unification but leaders
have not given up all hopes.

In the words of President

30
Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, London, Heinemann
Educational Books Ltd., 1963, P- 2l4.
31

Thomas M. Franck, East African Unitv Through L a w , New
Haven, Yale University Press, 1964, p. 161.
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Kenyatta:
It is true we made a declaration that we were going
to federate at the end of 1963, but it was impossible
to do so at that time.
We as a Government have laid
down our plans, but we cannot do all things we have
promised overnight.
Even angels could not do this.
It is impossible for me to give you the date when
Federation will be.32
However, if this remark is not entirely a gloomy appraisal

32
Jomo Kenyatta, Harambee !, p. 32.
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of past efforts to federate, it is a reflection of the in
tractable problems that had beset the paths of unity.

Lay

ing the foundation stone of the East African Common Services
Organization regional headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam on July
15, 1 9 6 5 , President Nyerere noted:
The failure of East Africa to federate is a great
shame.
So, I repeat, we prefer federation.
But if our
neighbours prefer a looser form of cooperation in the form
of the Common Market and the Common Services, I pledge
Tanzania's full cooperation in maintaining them.
33
By 1966 there grew the impression that the best that could
be expected of the former grandiose attempt to federate was
greater economic cooperation among the states.

Therefore,

on June 6 , 1 9 6 7 , Kenyatta, Obote and Nyerere signed a treaty
of economic cooperation in Kampala which became operative
on December 1, 1 9 6 7 .

The treaty established a Community

between Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda for the purpose of bring-

34
ing balanced development to the three countries.

The

treaty should be seen essentially as a corrective measure
that is designed to remove the imbalance and inequity which
constituted the weaknesses of the EASCO.

It allows the use

of a transfer tax as an instrument for controlling indus
trial development.

Under the transfer tax system, a member

state whose total trade in manufactured goods is in deficit

33
News in Brief, Africa Report, Vol. 10, No. 9, Oct. 1965,
p. 59.
34

See Appendix II.
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with- the other states can impose tariffs on imports from any
of the states.

The treaty also allows decentralization or

services and operations so that partner states could bene
fit from staff and organization managements.
By far the most important parts of the Treaty are
those establishing the common market, a method of counter
acting some of the existing economic imbalances between the
partner states, and the supra-national institutions that
are to administer the market, for between them they create
a completely new framework for the continuation of economic
cooperation between the three East African countries and
have the potential of limiting each country's freedom to
pursue its economic policies to a much greater extent than
has hitherto been the case.
35
The two important supra-national institutions consist of
the Common Market Council and the Common Market Tribunal,
The Council is charged with keeping the operation of the
Treaty under constant review and making sure that member
states keep to their pledge.

Questions concerning the ob

servance and interpretation of the treaty may be taken to
a judicial body, the Common Market Tribunal.

It also in

vestigates irregularities of partner states and acts as
advisory body to the Council.

It may be, therefore, that

the immediate importance of the treaty rests mainly on its
demonstration of the desire for continued and extended co
operation.
From the inception of the Common Market, Ethiopia,
Zambia and neighbouring Somalia have been expressing their

35
W. B. McAuslan,

"Recent Developments In Tanzania ,
World
Today, Vol. 24, No. 1, January
1968, p. 31.
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desire to be full members.

While Kenya, Uganda and Tanza

nia are still discovering what the Community really means
to their economies and political policies, they may hesi
tate to complicate Issues by admitting new members.

How

ever, it is almost certain that because of the fragile po
litical situations in East Africa, the only thing that can
be expected of the original attempt to federate is this by
product of economic association, at least for sometime to
come.
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CHAPTER IV
ATTITUDES TO OTHER AFRICAN STATES
We have to accept Africa as it is, and not imagine
that we have any more right to interfere with the
internal affairs of others than they have to inter
fere in ours....But we must be ready to co-operate
with all African states in African affairs, regard
less of our opinion of their internal - or even ex
ternal policies.
"
-Julius K. Nyerere, Tanzania Policy on Foreign
Affairs, p. 1 5 .
East African relations with other African states are
difficult to evaluate in precise terms.

Although,

official

continental policies are couched in brotherhood solidarity
phrases, inter-governmental relations are hampered by poor
communications.

For economic reasons, few Embassies are

established in other African countries.
visits are made to few "friendly" states.

Official state
In fact, before

the inauguration of the "Good Neighbor" Conference of 1966,
the East African states had very little contact with other
A f r i c a n .countries.

The OAU forum at Addis Ababa was the

only link enabling the East African leaders to be in touch
with fellow African politicians.

Close to home, goodwill

was degenerating as a result of border problems and/or
territorial disputes between Kenya and Somalia Republic,
Uganda and her neighbours.

This chapter will attempt to

show the East African responses to border problems and the
extent to which OAU resolutions have affected foreign policy
and attitudes of the East African states to three African
crises.
65
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BORDER PROBLEMS, TERRITORIAL DISPUTES AND NEIGHBOURLINESS
One of the most interesting and paradoxical phases of
pan-Africanism is probably the outcome of the O.A.U. summit
meeting of May 1 9 6 3 which gave some impetus to nationalist
feelings and irredentism in respect to the colonial-drawn
African boundaries.

The peaceful tone of the summit meet

ing was interrupted when President Osman of Somalia rose to
attack the host Emperor Selassie for refusing to grant a
plebiscite to the Somali people on the Ethiopian borders
Asserting his belief that the problem of Africa's misdrawn boundaries was a proper subject for debate at
the Conference, he said there could be no unity as long
as these problems remained.
For a moment the fate of
the Conference hung in the balance as the Emperor arose,
indignant over this slur.1
President Houphouet-Boigny, the chairman of that particular
session of the conference quickly intervened by sharply
criticizing the Somali action.

"Modibo Keita of Mali ex

pressed the opinion of many delegations in asking that the
conference should not be spoiled by this incident and urging
p
that the present frontiers in Africa be maintained".
This
speech was warmly applauded by delegates to the conference
and Somalia seemed to have lost all African support for her
boundary agitation.
In 1964 the Somali Government made another claim that

Norman J. Padelford, "The Organization of African Unity",
International Organization. Volume XVIII, No. 3,
Summer, 1964, p. 532.
A.A. Castagno, "Somali-Kenyan Controversy: The Future",
The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 2,
No. 2, July 1964, p. IP 2 .
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"all Somali peoples living outside the nation-state have a
right to self-determination, and thus the right to become
3
part of Somalia if they so wish".
This appeal was being c
directed to the Somalis inhabiting the Northern Frontier
District (N,F,D,) of Kenya,

The area is about 102,000

square miles and includes the dominantly Somali-inhabited
land of Mandera Wajio and Garissa with the mainly Galla
districts of Marsabit, Isiolo and Moyale,

Since I960 when

Somalia became independent, the N,F,D, has become the centre
of controversy between Kenya and Somalia,

The Somalis think

that the division of their land and people has been the fault
of colonial powers which created arbitrary boundaries that
defied enthographic logic.

On their part, the Kenyans feel

that the border problem directly affects national interests
that "even to recognize that boundaries are negotiable would
4
itself constitute a threat to the country's integrity".
However, the Somalis who constitute the bulk of the popula5
tion have been deeply resentful of the Kenyan claims.
They
have demanded secession from Kenya and unity with Somalia,
Their feeling of alienation and resentment towards Kenya
is accentuated by the steady social and economic developments

John Howell, "Analysis of Kenyan Foreign Policy",
The
Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol, 6, îîo, 1,
1968, p, 37.
Ibid, p, 41,
The total population of the N.F,D, was estimated in 1962
to be 388,000 out of which about 240,000 were considered
to be Somalis,
Ibid, p, 38,
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in Somalia relative to N.F.D. and accompanied by constant
doses of virulent propaganda^ from Radio Mogadishu,

They

also claim that the Kenyan Government has neglected them
for a long time.

For example, Ahmed Farah, the Somali

Legislative Council representative is quoted as saying
in the I 96O London Constitutional Conference that:
Sometimes the people of the N.F.D. think of the rest
of Kenya as quite a foreign country.
They have little
in common with the rest of Kenya....I had better say
what will happen if the administration of the Northern
Province is not changed.
I foresee that the Somali
and Boran and the Galla and the Turkans....will break
away in different directions./
When Kenya became independent in 1963, the Somalis

in the

N.F.D. began to organize armed, insurgent movements called
shifta with the support of the Somali Government.

In his

parliamentary speech on February 26, 1964, Jomo Kenyatta
reported that,
Early in January, gang attacks stopped in the border
area, but several gangs penetrated deep into the North
Eastern Region, where they made well organized and con
certed attacks on patrols and camps.
The whole pattern
changed as civilians in the Region were attacked, presu
mably to instill fear into the local population, to pro
mote a policy of non-cooperation with the Kenya Govern
ment and Security forces....There is no doubt at all
that the Somalia Government's policy of territorial
expansion has led to the killing of peaceful Kenya
citizens, straining our relations with that Government.

In his speech to the National Assembly on February 26,

1964 , Jomo Kenyatta spoke of "propaganda by Mogadishu
Radio and the policy of territorial expansion practised
by the Government of Somalia", Harambee!, p. 39. Also
see Colin Legum, "Somali Liberation Songs", The Journal
of Modern African Studies, Vol. 1, No. 4, March, 1963.
7
A.A. Castagno, "Soraali-Kenyan Controversy'.', p. 175*
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Mindful of this country's obligations in the maintenance
of peace and security, and in accordance with their own
declaration, the Kenya Government raised the matter in an
emergency Council of Ministers meeting of O.A.U. held in
Dar-es-Salaam two weeks ago.
The Council decided to in
clude the matter on the Agenda of its meeting now under
way in Lagos.°
Until 1 9 6 7 when a change in the Somali Government was ef
fected and Mohamed Egal became Prime Minister,
itiative at mediation was unsuccessful.

O.A.U. in

Somalia wanted

the O.A.U. to conduct a referendum on self-determination
of the Somalis in N.F.D.

Kenya insisted that she would not

allow any part of her territory to be dismembered and would
defend her "territorial integrity by every means".
Dr. Mungai, then Minister of Defense,

In I 966

said that, "our con

tention is borne out by the resolutions of both O.A.U. and
the Conference of the nonaligned nations held in Cairo in
1965.

Both Conferences agreed that the territorial inte

grity of the present African states must be m a i n t a i n e d " . ^
Thus, the border dispute between Kenya and Somalia arose
from conflicts in the application of Somalia's conception
of self-determination and Kenya's desire to retain the col
onial status quo in boundary arrangements.

When the O.A.U.

intervened again in October 19&7, a Working Committee was
established under President Kaunda of Zambia charged with
periodic review of the Somali-Kenyan relationship for the
g

Jomo Kenyatta, H a ra m be e!, pp. 39-41.
9

John Howell, "Kenyan Foreign Policy", Journal of Modern
African Studies, p. 40.
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purpose of promoting understanding between the two disput
ing countries.

Since then relations between the two coun

tries have improved considerably.
In Tanzania, the dispute with Malawi is territorial.
It arose on September 11, 1968 when Dr. Hastings Banda was
addressing a rally at Chitopwa, Malawi.

Pointing to a

part of the Tanzanian territory, he said, "That is my land
over there and these people - Tukuyu, Njombe and Songea are my subjects.

All of them must be given back;

the

British had no business to give away the land to someone
else".^®

A week later, during the opening session of the

annual convention of the malawi Congress Party, Dr. Banda
reiterated his claim also to the whole of neighbouring
Zambia's Eastern Province.

In Tanzania, the Government

dismissed Dr. Banda's claim as "insane, absurd and highly
provocative".

The condemnation went on:

When Tanzania repudiates Dr. Banda's claims, she
cannot ignore his words on the grounds that they have been
uttered by an insane person, because the powers behind the
so-called Ngwazi (Lion) are not insane.
In the world today,
there are many countries which are either under the direct
control of the imperialists or have their leadership mani
pulated by foreign remote control. '^
While it is difficult to explain objectively why Dr. Banda
chose this time to make his claim on sections of Zambia and
Tanzania territories. Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda of

Government of Tanzania, "Dr. Banda's Expansionist Claims",
United Republic of Tanzania News Bulletin, No. 5,
Dar-es-Salaam, September 1968, p. 1.
^^

Ibid., p. 2.
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Zambia alleged that Dr. Banda has been egged on by forces
of the Lisbon-Pretoria-Salisbury axis.

In fact, Tanzania

thinks that the appointment of a high ranking Military
Attache by South Africa to "a tiny country like Malawi is
proof that Malawi is a strategic spying post for South
Africa and Rhodesia".

1P

Consequently, Dr. Banda is regarda-

ed as a saboteur of African efforts to liberate dependent
territories in South Africa.
Of the three East African states, however, Uganda has
the most unusual form of border problems.
landlocked geographical position,

Because of her

she shares common borders

with many neighbours -Rwanda, Congo, Kenya and Tanzania.
While these countries have not formally laid claims to any
part of the Ugandan territory, the backlash of their dom
estic problems have usually affected Uganda.

In a speech

in Entebbe on August 3, 1968, Foreign Minister Odaka re
marked:
A pattern has arisen whereby whenever there are dist
urbances in one of the neighbouring countries, refugees
pour into Uganda.
Some of these refugees attempt to carry
out subversive activities against their countries of origin
and sometimes Uganda villages and border posts are attacked
by legal and illegal forces from neighbouring countries.
Uganda for instance witnessed this pattern of events on the
Rwanda, Congo and Sudan borders and the only time there is
relative calm on any of our borders is when there is peace
and stability in the country that shares that border. 1 3

12
^

Ibid.. p. 2.
S.N. Odaka,

Speech on Geography as a Determinant of
Uganda's Foreign Policy. Entebbe, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, 1968, p. 6.
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Thus, as a matter of necessity and in response to the refu
gee problems, Uganda has been trying to develop and streng
then relations with the neighbouring countries since the
Second Congo erruptions of 1964.

Kenya and Tanzania have

joined in on the assumption that.
If Tanzania works in harmony with Kenya and with Zambia,
then Kenya and Zambia are linked together.
If Kenya then
co-operates with Ethiopia^ then Tanzania and Zambia are both
linked to Ethiopia - and so on throughout our continent....
When these exist, then.all-African meetings can facilitate
and speed developments.
If these do not exist, then the
all-Africa meetings have to devote their time to patching
and mending the torn fabric of cooperation, instead of help
ing the move f o r w a r d . 14
In an attempt to formalize this setting of special relation
ship, the first "Good Neighbor" meeting of the East and
Central African heads of statesl^ was held in Nairobi on
March 31 to April 2, 1966.

It operated without an agenda

and a "spokesman emphasized that no attempt was made to
form a regional grouping or to usurp the functions of the
O.A.U."."^^

In his evaluation. President Nyerere claimed

that :
Indeed the Tanzania delegation was unanimously of the
opinion that we had never attended a more useful and cons
tructive political gathering.
Of course, that meeting did
not solve all the problems of this part of Africa; some of
them are too deep-seated and too complicated to be suscep
tible to such treatment.
But the meeting did create an
14
J.K. Nyerere, Tanzania Policy on Foreign Affai rs , Dar-esSalaam Information Services Division, 1967, p. 17.
15
The countries comprise of Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Cen
tral African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, Congo-Kinshasa,
Rwanda, Sudan, Zambia, Ethiopia, Somali Republic and
Burundi.
16
Good Neighbor Summit, Africa Report, Vol.1l, No.
May 1 9 6 6 , p. 1 5 .
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atmosphere in which problems could be tackled; it did con
tribute greatly to our common progress. 1 7
After the meeting, Obote invited President Mobutu of CongoLeopoldville to visit Uganda for a one-day discussion on
refugee problems.

Both leaders agreed that they would

allow greater freedom of movements for nationals on either
side of their borders.

*■

The third of the "Good Neighbor" Summit meetings of the
East and Central African heads of states was held in Kampala
on December 15-16, 1967 after the second meeting which was
held in Congo-Kinshasa late in 1966.

In his opening address

Obote appealed to his fellow heads of states for greater
co-operation.

He concluded by saying that "as good neighbours

we aim at removing obstacles that tend to separate us from .
each other.

We strive to develop resources that are of

mutual benefit to us all.

We unite to face challenges that

threaten our sovereignty and territorial integrity.

It is

in this that I see the emergence of a strong, viable and
meaningful co-operation".

1R

However,

from the reports of

the last meeting held in Dar-es-Salaam from May 13-15, 1968,
it would seem that the deliberations of the "Good Neighbor"
summit meetings are gradually extending to continental pro
blems.

The communique of the Dar-es-Salaam meeting,

for

example, "welcomed current efforts to find a peaceful

17
J.K. Nyerere, Tanzania Policy on Foreign Affairs, p. l8.

18
Milton Obote, "Good Neighbor" Summit, Africa Repor t.
Vol. 13, No. 2, February 1968, p. 25»
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solution to the Nigerian conflict; noted with concern the
deteriorating situation in Rhodesia and agreed on making
representations to states aiding Rhodesia, South Africa
and Portugal, called for the expulsion of South Africa from
the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development;

and reaf

firmed their support for the liberation movements in Southern A f r ica". 1^

fjo doubt, reports of the success of the East

and Central African "Good Neighbor" meetings have improved
intra-state communications now extending to other members
of the O.A.U. family.
THREE CRISES - CONGO, NIGERIA, ARAB-ISRAELI
While most African countries are in the initial stage
of political development, one of the pre-occupations of the
O.A.U. is to regulate the involvement of outside powers in
the African continent.

The Congo crisis and the Nigerian

civil war are cases that illustrate this phenomenon.
At the first outbreak of the Congo crisis in I960, no
East African state was independent, the O.A.U. had not been
formed and independent African states operated in splinter
groups.

When the crisis opened up again in 1964, Kenya was

one of the newly independent African countries.

The lead

ing members of the ruling KANU party expressed strong nation
alist feelings against outside intervention in African af-

19
"Good Neighbor" Summit, Africa Report, Vol. 13, No. 7,
October 1968, p. 25.
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fairs.

Joseph Murumbi the Minister for External Affairs,

launched a bitter attack on western policy:

We consider that the recent military intervention moun
ted by the United States and Belgium with the collaboration
of the United Kingdom, constitutes unwarranted influence in
African affairs.a flagrant violation of the United Nations
Charter, a threat to the peace and security of the African
continent and a calculated attempt to undermine African
unity,
20
In September 1964, an :Ad hoc Conciliation Commission was
appointed by the O.A.U. in Addis Ababa with the mandate to
finding "ways and means to effect national reconciliation
within the Congo and the normalization of relations between
21
Congo-Leopoldville and its neighbors",
Jomo Kenyatta was
named as head for the Commission.

On September l8, 1964,

the meeting of the ad hoc Commission was held in Nairobi
and an appeal was made for cessation of hostilities in the
Congo.

Later the Commission decided that, "all white mer

cenaries and foreign troops should be withdrawn forthwith
from the Congo and that all foreign interventions should

22
cease immediately".

The Commission also dispatched an

unsuccessful mission to ask President Johnson to end U.S.
military intervention in the Congo.

But whether or not the

O.A.U. mediation and initiative were effective is not the
focus of the Congo crisis, nor of this analysis;

what is

John Howell, "Kenyan Foreign Policy", Journal of Modern
African Studies, p. 31.
-'1

Joseph Murumbi - Kenya, Plenary Meeting of the U.N. Gen
eral Assembly, 19th' Session (English) Dec. 7, 1964,
A/PV. 1293, pp. 8-10,
Ibid, pp. 8-10.
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significant is the unanimous African resentment towards out
side intervention.

The following speeches of the other two

East African states to the U.N. General Assembly of December
1964 would illustrate this.
1. My country (Tanzania) was shocked and horrified
that at the very time that the O.A.U, was seeking an African
solution, at the very time that the ad hoc Commission was
establishing its competence, certain non-African Powers
thought it fit to frustrate the efforts of the O.A.U. by
unwarranted military intervention.
This military interven
tion....is a clear affront to the O.A.U. and shamefully de
tracts from the U.N. efforts in the Congo during the past
four years. My country, therefore, earnestly requests those
foreign Powers intervening with their troops, arms and mer
cenaries to withdraw all these unwanted instruments of neo
colonialism and allow the Congolese people, and only the
Congolese people, and their African brothers to settle the
problems facing them in an African manner, by themselves. 23
2.
The Uganda delegation appeals to all outside Powers
involved in the Congo situation to use their influence to
end the fighting which has resulted in the unnecessary loss
of so many lives.
It is also vital that the white mercena
ries should be withdrawn, in order to give the Reconcilia
tion Commission a chance to tackle the problem.
24
The Nigerian civil war is another classic example of how
African states deplore outside intervention in continental
matters.

T'hen the war started in 1964, Nigeria identified

the pattern of the crisis with that of the Congo, Ojukwu
with Tshombe and the secessionist Biafra with Katanga.

At

the O.A.U. summit in Congo-Kinshasa in September 1967, a

23
Karabona-Tanzania, Plenary Meeting of the U.N. General
Assembly! 19th Session (English) December
To, 1964, A/PV. 1293, p. 77,
24
Odaka-Uganda, U.N. General Assembly Debates, December
7, T964, A/PV. 1293, p. 77.
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Consultative Committee of six Heads of States was appointed
under Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia to help Nigeria
bring an end to the conflict.

In setting up the Committee,

the O.A.U. affirmed its support for the territorial inte
grity of Nigeria and admitted the internal character of the
conflict.

In addition, most African states blamed external
»

interests for the causes of the civil war.

In Uganda,

Foreign Minister S. N. Odaka said that:
The tragedies that have befalled Nigeria have come
because international involvement has highlighted differ
ences and exaggerated not only the differences of tribe and
religion existing in that country but gone out of their way
to illuminate the already enlarged identification tags....
Some enthusiastic men have even attempted to equate the
plight of Ibos^S as similar in every respect to that of the
Jews. We have been told that they are a persecuted tribe
and r a c e . 26
However, not all African states would interpret the Nigeri27
an civil war in the same perspective as Uganda.
President
Nyerere has vigorously protested that external factors were
responsible for the Congo crisis whereas, in Nigeria, seces
sion was roused by internal forces.

Therefore, "Presidents

Kaunda and Nyerere have both been concerned that a bloody

25
The Ibos constitute the predominant ethnic group in the
secessionist province.
By the 1964 Nigerian census fi
gures, the Ibos numbered 8.2 million of the 13 million
people in the region.

26
S. N. Odaka,
Speech on Our Institutions and Foreign
Aspects, Entebbe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
19 SB, p. 4.
27
Four countries have recognized the secessionist Nigeri
an sta.te-Tanzania, Zambia, Gabon": and Ivory Coast,
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civil war undermines the claims that they are pressing on
the front line in Southern Africa....Their argument goes,
accept the division of Nigeria and concentrate on the more

28
important task in hand in Southern Africa".

In fact, in

recognizing the secessionist state. President Nyerere ex
plained that:
For 10 months we have accepted the Nigerian Government's
legal right to our support in a "police action to defend the
integrity of the State".
On that basis, we have watched a
civil war result in the death of about 100,000 people, and
the employment of mercenaries by both sides.
¥e watched the
federal government reject the advice of Africa to talk
instead of demanding surrender before talks could, begin.
Everything combined gradually to force us to the conclusion
that Nigerian unity did not exist.
29
In spite of whatever compassion and the good intentions that
Nyerere must have had towards Biafra his recognition of sec
ession is regarded by most African states as an open viola
tion of the O.A.U. resolution which recognized the Nigerian
civil war as a domestic problem.

Most Africans believe that

the balkanization of Africa would invite chaos, therefore,
territorial integrity, sovereignty and non-interference in
domestic affairs of member states have remained sacrosanct
in the O.A.U. Charter.
At the O.A.U. Summit in Algiers in September 1968, the
four countries which recognized Biafra found themselves in

28
Note of the Month,
"The O.A.U. and the Nigerian Issue",
World Today, Vol. 24, No. 11, November 1968, p. 450.,
29
Why Tanzania Recognized Biafra,
No. 6, June 1968, p. 27.

Africa Report, Vol. 13,
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a difficult situation.

Strong denunciations were made of

the "imperialist attempt to divide Nigeria hy leaders of
impeccable African record like President Keita"
sident Houari Boumedienne of Algeria,

30

and Pre

Of the four countries

which recognized Biafra, only President Kaunda of Zambia
attended the Conference as head of his country's delegation;
others were represented on the ministerial level.

Even

President Kaunda had to leave early and protested "at being
lumped with the imperialists".

At the end of the summit, a

resolution was passed which "appeals to the secessionist
leaders to cooperate with the Federal authorities in order
31
to restore peace and unity in Nigeria".
In asserting
Kenya's support for the resolution, Arwings-Kodhek, Minis
ter of State in the Office of the Kenyan President said in
the U.N. General Assembly on October 15, 1968 that:
I should now like to make reference to a special Afric
an problem, which for more than a year has been the focal
point while external arms and ammunition have been clash
ing.
I refer, of course, to Nigeria.
It is barely three
weeks since we came to some understanding on this African
problem at the O.A.U. Summit in Algiers.
It is lamentable
that outsiders are still active in that African country. 32
However, thé unequivocal support given to Nigeria by Kenya,
Uganda and many African states may not necessarily be con
strued as a reflection of deep allegiance to the O.A.U.
30
Op. c i t .. p. 4 5 0 .
31
O.A.U. Resolution on Nigeria,
Africa Report, Vol. 13,
No. 8, November 1968, p. 21.
32

Arwings-Kodhek, M.P. -Kenya, Soeech to the 23rd Session
of the U.N. General Assembly. Kenya Mission to
the U.N., Information Section, Oct. 15, 1968, p.7.
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For example, these countries did not break

diplomatic relations with Britain in accordance with the
O.A.U. resolution on Rhodesia.

The fact on Nigeria is that

most African countries, particularly Uganda and Kenya, are
apprehensive of laying a precedence:

for possible secessio

nist tendencies in other parts of Africa.
».

This has been

■

the trump card of Nigerian diplomacy.
Although the East African states were not unanimous
in their support of the O.A.U. interpretation of the Nigerian
civil war, on the Arab-Israeli conflict, they fully endorsed
O.A.U. resolutions.

Before the 1967 war, Israel had esta

blished considerable influence in sub-Saharan Africa.

In

an attempt to offset the geo-political Arab advantage in
Africa, Israel maintained embassies in every country except
Somalia and Mauritania.

Israeli experts were helping to

train the Ugandan pilots, youth-mobilizing and agrarian
centred movements along Israeli model were established in
Tanzania,

joint stock companies were formed in Kenya.

In

effect, Israeli influence was increasing as many African
leaders were getting ambivalent of Arab position in Africa.
This phenomenon still affected the attitudes of Uganda in
1 9 68 as could be illustrated from the speech of Foreign

Minister, S.N. Odaka, in Entebbe.
In the north, we find countries which belong to two
different worlds.
It has been authoritatively stated and
is a well-known fact that such countries as Egypt and for
that matter Sudan at our border, are both African and
therefore members of the O.A.U. and members of the Arab
League and simultaneously involved in the Middle East pol
itics and conflicts, including the Arab Israeli conflict.
To make natters worse, unlike Uganda, these countries in
their foreign policies place majoi emphasis on religious
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considerations since they are part of the Islamic world. 33
Immediately after the Arab-Israeli June war of 1967, Afric
an attitudes began to change from former ambivalence or proIsrael to outright sympathy for the Arab underdog.

The be

lief that the first shot was probably fired by Israel and
the apparent Israeli unwillingness to surrender occupied
areas strongly reinforced African suspicion of Israeli im
perialism.

In the O.A.U. Summit at Kinshasa on September

23, 1 9 6 7 , the Middle East situation was discussed and a re34
solution was passed expressing "sympathy for the U.A.R.",
but the O.A.U. agreed only to work through the United Rat
ions to help the U.A.R. to recover its occupied territories.
In Tanzania, President Nyerere said that:
The establishment of the State of Israel was an act of
aggression against the Arab People.
It was connived at by
the international community because of the history of per
secution against the Jews.
We recognize Israel and wish to
be friendly with her as well as with the Arab nations.
But
we cannot condone aggression on any pretext, nor accept vic
tory in war as a justification for the exploitation of other
lands, or government over other peoples.
35
Julius Nyerere even sent a cable to President Nasser

offer

ing aid "in,defense of your rights against imperialism".
In the U.N. General Assembly, Kenya decried the effects of
the closure of the Suez Canal on her economy.

On the pol

itical aspect of the war, Arwings-Kodhek said.
33
S. Odaka,
Speech on Geography As a Determinant of
Uganda's Foreign'Policy, Entebbe, 19 6 8 , p .3.

34
O.A.U. at Kinshasa, Africa Report, Vol. 12, No. 7, Oct.

1967, p; 25.
35
J. K . Nyerere, Tanzania policy on Foreign Affairs, pp.6-7.
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The Government of Kenya proceeds from the belief that
all states have a right to exist. We do not share the phi
losophy of permanent belligerency now maintained against
Israel by some of her neighbors.
On the other hand, the
Government of Kenya cannot support the further occupation
by Israel of Arab territory it brought under its control
during the six-day war.
The language of the United Nations
Charter is clear and unequivocal on the question of terri
torial aggrandisement;
as we have already reminded the
Assembly, it urges its signatories to refrain from the ac
quisition of foreign territory through conquest.
36
When the Middle East conflict came up again at the O.A.U.
Summit in Algiers in September 1968, the three East Afric
an states unanimously voted along with other thirty-three
states to adopt a resolution which "reaffirms support for
the U .A . R . , calls for the withdrawal of foreign troops from
Arab territories occupied since June 5, 1967 in accordance
with the U.N. Security Council resolution of November 22,
1967 and appeals to all members to apply this resolution
37
strictly".
However, the resolution did not condemn or

mention Israel by name, neither had the diplomatic relations
between the East African states and Israel changed too dra
matically.

In fact, Israel has not broken diplomatic rela

tions with any African state in protest against the O.A.U.
resolution.
Finally, two conclusions can be drawn from the above
analysis of the East African reactions to African problems.
Firstly, that border disputes can best be solved through

36
Arwings-Kodhek,

Speech to the U.N. General Assembly,
'pp. 8-9.

37
Middle East O.A.U. Resolution, Africa Report. Vol. 13,
No. 8, November 1968, p. 21.
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improved communications with neighbouring states.

This was

demonstrated by the success of President Obote in discus
sing refugee problems with President Mobutu of Congo-Leop
oldville after the first meeting of the "Good Neighbor"
Meeting in 1966,

Secondly, that O.A.U. resolutions have,

to varying degrees, affected the general attitudes of the
East African states in respect to outside interventions and
continental policies.

This is evident from the violent con

demnation of outside intervention in the case of the Congo
and the unanimous support for the U.A.R. after the O.A.U.
resolution on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

On the Nigerian

crisis, opinions of the East African leaders differ but
Kenya and Uganda have subscribed to the O.A.U. idea that
secession should be discouraged in any independent African
country.
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CHAPTER V

EAST AFRICA AND THE WORLD
The African has, as you know, a pride and determina
tion that his new status will have its own African
character. He will not imitate the East any more
than he will the West.
»fhile he may draw from other
societies, the end-product will have a distinct Afri
can character.'
- G. Mennen Williams,
Documents on Modern Africa,
p. 142.
One of the most important results of the epochal de
colonization in East Africa has been the responsibility im
posed on the leaders for the formulation of policies that
relate to their external affairs.

For these leaders, for

eign policy is the continuation of the task of state-build
ing.

The conduct of external relations is a test of poli

tical maturity and an expression of the nation's independ
ence within the international community.

Membership to the

United Nations and participation in the deliberations of
its various bodies, exchange of protocol and diplomatic re
cognition from foreign governments, attendance at other in
ternational gatherings and opportunity for the free expres
sion of views on international issues are regarded as leg
itimate symbols of state sovereignty and prestige.
In this chapter, attempts shall be made to analyze the
1

The quotation is from the speech: "American Policy in
Africa Explained by the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State
for African Affairs", given before the African Studies
Association on October 12, 1962 and edited by T. Walter
Wallbank in Documents on Modern Afric a, New Jersey, D.
Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1964, p. l42.
84
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foreign policy of the East African states in respect to nonalignment, general attitudes to the East and West including
the Commonwealth, and the policy towards the United Nations
as a world organization.

Continental policies of unity and

good neighbourliness have been examined in the preceeding
chapters, however, I shall feel free to elaborate the exs
tent to which commitments to decolonization have affected
relations with the West.
IHECRT CP NONALIGNMENT
Insofar as foreign policy helps to provide a medium of
asserting national identity, for the new states, nonalign
ment presents an attractive policy for maximizing advanta
ges and yet maintaining independent
colonial power.

status from the former

In East Africa, nonalignment is the logical

acceptance of the traditional doctrine of sovereignty and
of attempts to apply it to contemporary international af
fairs ,
But non-alignment has often suffered from lack of pre
cise definition.

Some people speak of "non-commitment"

others of "positive neutralism" and still others speak of
"dynamic neutrality".

To label the non-alignment policy

of the East African states as neutrality would be very mis
leading.

This is because neutrality does not clearly des

cribe the policies of smaller countries in relation to a
power-rivalry especially in time of peace.

It may, however,

refer to the policies of such a country as Switzerland which
has consistently followed its neutrality in war and in peace
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,times.
such;

In East Africa, non-alignment is not neutrality as
neither is it really non-commitment.

Nonalignment

is a sort of insurance policy, guaranteeing an uninhibited
voice on international issues and allowing the countries
to stress their claim to uniqueness.

For example, the po

licy of the Kenya African National Union states that;
f.

Nonalignment is not based on Kenya's desire to be left
alone, but on a desire to be taken notice of.
Our policy
is one of nonalignment, not noncommitment.
We fully commit
ourselves to support what is right and just in internation
al affairs.
2
Oginga Odinga, leader of the Kenya People's Union, provides
another definition that draws on the realities of the power
blocs and the role of nonalignment policy.

"Nonalignment,

let us remember, means that we shall tie ourselves to no
power bloc;

and that while we shall not necessarily.opt

for neutrality on every issue, ours will be the freedom to
decide".

Thus the terms "non-commitment" or "neutrality"

must be qualified when used to substitute for nonalignment.
President Nyerere intended to bring out the implica
tions of nonalignment when he said that, "we care very much
about the future of humanity;

but we do not believe that

the present divisions of the world are between the good and
the bad...We believe that the propaganda which is directed
at making humanity believe this proposition is a most hid-

2
John Howell,

"An Analysis of Kenyan Foreign Policy",
The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.6,
No. 1, 1968, p. 35.

3
Oginga Odinga,
Not Yet Uhur u, New York, Hill and Wang,
1967, p. 286.
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An interpretation of this strong sense of

morality and idealism is that Tanzania reserves the right
to judge international issues on their own merits and
that the country is as committed to objective action for
universal peace as the Great Powers.
But in spite of these goals and interpretations it
is still difficult to know the true intentions of these
nonaligned states.

It is probably true that motivation

of economic development, anticolonialism and psychological
reactions against former European political control and
exploitation have induced the East African leaders to choose
nonalignment in the conduct of their relations with both
East and West.

Clearly, this policy does not imply indif

ference or non-commitment on contemporary international
issues beside the Cold War, but encompasses the strategy
being used to manipulate both East and West to obtain
modernization priorities without necessarily losing sover
eignty and political independence to any of the blocs.
When President John Kennedy was a Senator, he admitted that:
The desire to be independent and free carries with it
the desire not to become engaged as a satellite of the Soviet
Union or too closely allied to the United States.
We have
to live with that, and if neutrality is the result of a
concentration on internal problems, raising the standard
of living of the people and so on, particularly in the
underdeveloped countries, I would accept that.
It's part
of our own history for over a hundred y e a r s . 5

Julius Nyerere, Freedom and U n i t y , p. 1$4.
Burton, W. J. , Nonalignment. New York, James Heineman Inc.,
1966, p. 15.
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This seems to be a fair portrayal of the attitudes of the
East African leaders.

Faced with the desperate struggle to

build a nation from very slender resources, nonalignment is
not only an attractive policy, but discretion in taking and
shifting friends is regarded as a worthy strategy.

When on

October 19, 1965, the Central Executive Committee of the
Uganda People's Congress meeting in Kampala approved reso
lutions reaffirming the party's adherence to a foreign po
licy of nonalignment and instructed members to "refrain
from using abusive language against any country with which
Uganda has diplomatic relations"^ the leaders were trying
to consolidate their strategy for attracting foreign aid
from the East and the West.

Similarly, Jomo Kenyatta's

speech that, "the foundation of Kenya's foreign policy is
7
the principle of nonalignment",
is no less an invitation
to foreign powers, irrespective of ideology, to help Kenya.
This may appear to be an oversimplification of the intents
and purposes of nonalignment policy.

But considering the

needs of the East African states and in view of their gen
eral economic deprivations, nonalignment seems to have been
a diplomatic weapon for achieving benefits to meet domestic
problems.

6
News in Brief,

Africa Report, Vol. 10, No.11, Bee. 1965,
p. 31.

Jomo Kenyatta,

Harambee!, p. 57.

7
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But in spite of the narrow national interests which
nonalignment seems to be satisfying, the East African states
have stuck to the criteria of the Belgrade Conference of
1 9 6 1 which recommended that a non-aligned state:

1.

should follow an independent policy based on nonalignment (I) and peaceful co-existence;
2. should support liberation movements;
3 . should not be a member of a multilateral military
pact in the context of the East-West struggle;
4. should not be a member of a bilateral military
pact with a Big Power in the East-West struggle;
5* should not have granted military bases to foreign
powers."

Because of nationalism, claims of uniqueness and need for
rapid economic development. East African countries are like
ly to remain non-aligned for a long time, although,
will be more nonaligned than others.

some

The extent to which

nonalignment has been put into practice by each state shall
be examined in the next section.
RELATIONS WITH EAST AND WEST (including the Commonwealth)
Whatever people may think about the possibility of
detente between East and West, recent international politics
have been largely influenced by ideological orientations
which have divided the world into camps.

The emerging coun

tries have found themselves at the crossroad of this harsh
expressed reluctance to be conscripted into either of the
two main ideological camps.

According to President Nyerere:

8
David K. Marvin, Emerging Africa in World Affairs, Cali
fornia, Chandler Publishing Company, 1965, p. 215.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

'

90

Before independence we had no direct contact with East
ern Bloc countries.
After independence, we began to esta
blish such contacts and we shall continue to strengthen them
....It should be clear that we shall not allow anyone - whe
ther they be from East or West, or from places not linked
to these Blocks - to try and use our friendship for their
own purposes.
9
But, have the East African countries practised the nonalign
ment policy which they espoused?

Have the East and West

been given equal treatment in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda?
Kenya's foreign policy is, no doubt, characterized by
a nonalignment orientation in favour of the West.

While

Jomo Kenyatta and the KANU Party have continued to make
right noises about the righteousness of a nonaligned policy
and the desirability for a just international community of
nations, Kenya's sympathy has usually been disposed towards
the Western bloc.

The domestic political system, demands

for foreign aid and the capitalist structure of the economy
have bolstered the pro-Western attitude since independence.
Conversely, there is a trend to distinctly hostile attitudes
towards the Communist states, especially to China, after
Oginga Odinga left the KANU government party in 1966 to form
the socialist Opposition KADU party.

Before the split, Jomo

Kenyatta addressed the KANU members that;
What we want is Kenya Nationalism which helped us to
win the struggle against imperialism.
We do not want some
body else's nationalism.
It is a sad mistake to think that
you can get more food, more hospitals or schools by crying
"Communism". 10
9
Julius K. Nyerere,

Tanzania on Foreign Affairs, p. 4.

10
News in Brief, Africa Report, Vol.10, No,7, July 1966, p.25.
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In 1965 Njoroge Mungai, Minister of Internal Security and
Defense declared Wang Te Ming, Nairobi correspondent of the
Communist Chinese Hsinhua News Agency, a prohibited immig
rant and declared that Kenyans would no longer be allowed to
receive military training in Communist China.

In February

1 9 6 6 , the government announced that it had canceled the

agreement with the Soviet Union to construct the Kano ir»
rigation project and postponed all other projects that were
to be financed by Soviet loans,
Kenya, which rejects aid from most Communist states
has rejected all forms of Chinese aid, including China's
offer of a #30 million loan and grant in 1964.
On the
other hand, Tanzania has become a primary recipient of
Chinese foreign aid and of assistance from all other for
eign sources.
11
Ostensibly, Kenya's pro-Western nonalignment policy is a
result of economic pressures.

Jomo Kenyatta does not intend

to alienate the Western aid-giving countries.

Nor, for that

matter, does he like to create an atmosphere that is unfav
ourable to prospective entrepreneurs;

so Kenya pursues a

policy that radically undermines Communist influence.
it would seem that practice conflicts with theory.

Here,

Jomo

Kenyatta had earlier propounded that "the aim of my Govern12
ment which starts today is not to be pro-Left or pro-Right"^

that a nonalignment policy would enable Kenya to secure
11

George I. Yu, "Dragon in the Hush: Peking's Presence in
Africa", Asian Survey, Vol.VIII, N o , 12, Dec. 19 6 6 ,
p. 1 0 2 2 .
1 c>

Jomo Kenyatta,

Harambee! p. 1 8 .
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assistance from the two blocs and that:
Ifhen we choose some techniques from the East, it is
not because we approve the conduct of their domestic or
foreign policies;
nor should we be accused of being proWest if we adopt or perpetuate some Western ideas.
We are
determined to develop Kenya as a democratic African Social
ist country.
13
In reality, Kenya has restricted communications with the
Communist countries, rejected their aid and shifted more
9»

and more to the West.

For example,

"at independence there

were just 20 American businesses in the country.

Then pros

pects turned rosier - and today there are 73 United States
14
firms established in Kenya".
A U.S. Embassy survey rep
orted in International Commerce

(Washington, D.C.) on October

2, 1967 noted that "Kenya's political stability and expand
ing economy are attracting the growing interest of U.S.
15
exporters and investors".
The report also noted that U.S.
exports to Kenya rose from #13.5 million in 1963 to #31.6
million in 1966 while U.S. imports from Kenya increased from
# 7 . 3 million in 1965 to $l4.8 million in 1966.

In 1964,

about 84 percent of total Kenyan trade were with the West
and only 2 percent with the Communist bloc.

In 1966,

Oginga Odinga protested that:
I cannot tolerate an African regime dominated by either
West or the East.
If nonalignment is used to justify rela
tions with one of these worlds alone, it is not nonalignment.
Kenya is still, today, largely part of the Western sphere
of interest and investment.
To reach the nonaligned position

13
Ibid, p . 78 .
14

"American Investment Surge", Reporter: East Africa's
News Magazine. Nairobi, June IB, 1 9 6 8 , p . 17.

15
News in Brief, Africa Report. Vol.13, N 0 .I, Jan.1968, p.23
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we must break the predominantly Western influence and
develop relations with the E a s t . l 6
Regardless of domestic opposition pressures for improved
relations with the East, the Kenya Government is showing
greater concern for the outward forms of nonalignment
policy:and less to its substance.

Formal diplomatic re

lations and some commercial activities exist between Kenya
and the Communist countries but they are not strong enough
to withstand stresses.

On February 1^, 1968, a government

statement announced the deportation of two Russians of the
Novosti Press Agency and Sovex portfilm.

Vice President

Daniel arap Moi said that the offices of both Soviet Agen
cies would be closed and warned that "methods used by host
ile intelligence services to subvert and undermine govern
ments and to carry their ideological battles into countries
which have repeatedly expressed their intention of remain17

ing nonaligned " ' would not be tolerated.

However,

it is

noteworthy that, "China has increased its trade with Kenya
notwithstanding a steady deterioration in political rela
tions.

In 1 9 6 6 direct exports from China to Kenya reached

million, as compared to $23,000 in I 9 6 I; during the
same years direct imports from Kenya came to $2.6 million
and $1 5 0 , 0 0 0 respectively".
16

Oginga Odinga, Not Yet U h u r u . p. 2 8 5 .
17

News in Brief, Africa Report. Vol. 12, No.
1 9 6 8 , p. 2 3 .

April

18

George, T. Yu, Asian Survey. December 1968, p. 1021.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

94
•On the other hand, Kenya's support for the Commonwealth
has probably encouraged close relationship with Britain.
Apart from the economic and military assistance from Bri
tain, Jomo Kenyatta sees in the Commonwealth, a philosophy
of racial harmony that could be applied to the Kenyan multi
racial society.

In his report of the 1964 Commonwealth

meeting to the National Assembly, he remarked:
As regards the call for interracial harmony in the
world, there was a definite commitment for each Commonwealth
country to build a society providing for equal opportunities
and non-discrimination for all its people.
In this respect,
I did not hesitate to quote the example of Kenya.
19
In terms of aid and trade Kenya relies on the Commonwealth
countries especially Britain.

Until independence Britain

normally provided nearly all the assistance but since 1963,
Western countries outside the Commonwealth, have extended
aid to Kenya.

In 1964, Britain spent 15 million pounds in

aid to Kenya.
Some long-term funds for industry, mining and housing
as well as agriculture have been supplied by the Commonweal
th Development Corporation....The total of the Corporation's
other investments rose from 7.1 million pounds at the end
of ,1958 to over 8.25 million pounds at the end of 1965.
20
The advantages and benefits accruing from membership to the
Commonwealth have been reflected in Kenya's attitude for the
survival of the Association,

"This became particularly

19
Jomo Kenyatta, Karambee!, p. 52.

20
Commonwealth Secretariat, Commonwealth Development and
Its Financing, London, Her Majesty's Stationery
Office, 1 9 677 p. 2 3 .
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clear at the London Commonwealth Conference of July 1966,
when the Kenyan delegation was instrumental in creating a
measure of agreement between Britain and the ad hoc,African
caucus on Rhodesia, which at one stage appeared unlikely".

P1

Since the civil war in Nigeria, the coup d'etat in Ghana,
the instability in Uganda and th e .temporary, Tanzanian
withdrawal of diplomatic relations with Britain over Rhodesia,
Kenya has assumed a mediatory role on certain matters between
African members and the rest of the Commonwealth.

Corres

pondingly, Kenya's stock and prestige have increased in
British Government circles.

And because Kenya has not

backed out on sensitive African problems such as decoloni
zation, she also enjoys the confidence and respect of fel
low African members of the Association.
However, it would be misleading to give the impression
that Kenya is complacent about her relations with Britain
and the West.

Kenyatta had been disenchanted with the

Western acquiescence in the apartheid policy of South Africa.
In a speech in June 1964, he expressed shock over the continu
ation and improvement of Western trade and investments in
South Africa.

"By refusing to participate in workable sanc

tions against South Africa, the countries of the West are
creating a situation in which violence becomes the only

21
John Howell, "An Analysis of Kenyan Foreign Policy",
Modern African Studies, p. 48.
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answer".

pp

Jomo Kenyatta also regards the lack of Western

support for the nationalist cause in Rhodesia, Mozambique
and Angola primarily as a Western intention to compromise
Africans'

rights to self-determination.

On Vietnam, Kenya has been dismayed over the U.S.
involvement in an "unjust" war.

Addressing the United

Nations General Assembly in October 1968, Arwings-Kodhek,
Kenyan Minister of state in the Office of the President
said that:
The policy of the Government of Kenya is clear on
the issue of Vietnam.
We condemn unreservedly the arro
gance of a Big Power that sees fit to tread on the toes
of a small nation without provocation.
We feel, more
over, that this is a futile war in which the mighty obvi
ously cannot hope to win...We believe that peace can come
to that unfortunate land any time the United States
wishes.28
Clearly, Kenya's stand is consistent with her frequent
reassertion of the need for world peace and a just inter
national community of nations.

Therefore, condemnation

of U.S.. on Vietnam is not necessarily an anti-Western
policy.

The Fact that U.S. attitude towards Kenya has

not changed since then is a reinforcement of this argument.
Tanzania's practice of nonalignment shows how difficult
it is for a small African country to actively seek the
application in Southern Africa of the principle of the
rights of peoples everywhere to self-determination and at
the same time to remain on friendly terms with Western countries.

22
Jomo Kenyatta, H a r a mb ee !, p. 49.
23
Arwings-Kodhek, M.P. - Kenya Speech to the 23rd Session,
U.N. General A s se mb ly . October 15, 1968, p. 10.
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tike most countries emerging from colonial status, Tanzania
.was heavily dependent upon the western world at the time of
independence.

Over 80 percent of her total trade was with

the sterling area while most of the top posts in the Civil
Service were held by personnels from the West.
1964 the situation changed dramatically.

But in

The change was

brought about by a rapid succession of events - "the revolu
tion in neighbouring Zanzibar, the mutinies of the three
East African armies which necessitated an appeal to British
troops, the union of Tanganyika with Zanzibar under the
name of Tanzania, the Chinese offer of military advisers
and a loan, the rebellion in the neighbouring Congo which
caused refugees to pour over the borders, and the declar
ation of war on Portugal by Mozambique freedom fighters
plx
based in Tanganyika".
This list of events and Tanzania's
reactions urged a re-evaluation of the country's foreign
policy.
To begin with, the union with Zanzibar gave rise to
certain diplomatic problems.

Zanzibar had been maintaining

diplomatic relations with East Germany before union.

This

was a violation of the Hallstein doctrine on which West
Germany broke relations with Zanzibar.

On the other hand,

Tanganyika recognized West Germany before union, an action

24
Catherine Hoskyns, "Africa's Foreign Relations", Inter
national Affairs, Vol. 44, No. 3, July 1968,
p. 4 5 2 .
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that conformed with the spirit of the Hallstein doctrine.
In an attempt to tackle the problem squarely, accomodate
each other and compromise the foreign threats to unification,
Tanganyika and Zanzibar decided to extend diplomatic rela
tions to both East and West Germany.

This was unacceptable

to West Germany and the latter stopped military aid to
Tanzania.

President Nyerere reacted by rejecting develop

ment aid from Bonn as well.
Also before 1964, Tanzania and other African states
relied on gentle and discreet diplomacy to secure the trans
ference of power from the colonial governments.

By 1964

it became clear that diplomacy would be of no avail in
liberating Southern Africa, Mozambique and Angola.

Most

African governments had to decide to what lengths they
would go in opposing the policies of these Western countries
which they regarded as impeding liberation.

Tanzania adopted

the most militant position of the three East African herself
as the enemy of Britain, France, West Germany or the United
States.

But it does mean that her passionate concern for

liberation brings her into frequent and inevitable conflict
with these countries.

Besides, the presence of the Mozam

bique liberation group FRELIMO in Tanzania has undoubtedly
reinforced Tanzania's anti-Portuguese policies at the same
time that it has raised the fear of Portuguese retaliatory
bombing of Dar-es-Salaam if FRELIMO becomes too active in
Mozambique.

The exiles' presence has stimulated a heavy

inflow of arms into Tanzania from the Eastern bloc and
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probably necessitated the build-up of the Tanzanian army
as a potential counter weight to the nationalist fighters
in case things get out of hand.

Thus, domestic conside

rations and Tanzania's commitment to continental African
freedom meant closer ties should be maintained with the
East in order to receive supplies of military hardware to
aid nationalist forces.
But in his opening of the window to the East, Nyerere
expressed the desire to steer clear of the East-West con
flict.

On his first state visit to the People's Republic

of China in February 1965, he used an East African proverb
to express Tanzania's policy that:
When elephants fight, it is the grass which gets
crushed...where there are hostile blocs facing each other
on the world stage Tanzania will ignore the threats or
blandishments from both sides and pursue her own interests.
..It is tnis belief which underlies our opposition to colo
nialism and neocolonialism.
We wish to be friendly with
all, and we will never allow our friends to choose our
enemies for u s . 25
However, events following the state visit to China have
further vindicated Nyerere's lukewarm attitude to the West.
Firstly, Nyerere saw in China, the image and prototype of
Tanzania's economic structure and was highly impressed by
the Chinese self-reliance policy which was yielding rapid
economic development.

It should be remembered that follow-;

Julius Nyerere, Freedom and Un i t y , pp. 323-324.
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ing the 1949 Communist Revolution in China, Western aid was
withdrawn but Mao-Tse-tung organized the economy, regulated
the living standards of the people and expanded agricultur
al production.

The 19&7 Tanzanian self-reliance Declarat

ion at Arusha was probably a tribute to this model.
Secondly, Chinese extension of credits and loans to
Tanzania had been generous.

'•"By June 1968, China had of

fered the country a total of $36.3 million in loans.

All

aid has been allocated to development expenditures with
projects ranging from a completely equipped textile mill,
the development of a state farm, and assistance in the con
struction of a police academy to the offer to survey and

26
construct the Tan-Zam railroad".

The construction of the

railroad would cost China over #300 million.

This is the

boldest single project yet to be undertaken by China in
Africa.

When the project was first proposed, Western fin

ance was refused because organizations that studied its
feasibility reported that costs would be greater than the
economic advantage.

Tanzania placed high value on the pro

ject and proposed to receive aid wherever possible.
The ready involvement of China in Tanzania's develop
ment considerably undermined Western influence as Tanzania's
policy gradually became hardened against the West.

In

December 1965, Tanzania rejected a #21 million loan from

26
George T. Yu,

Asian Survey, Dec. 1968, p. 1021.
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and broke off diplomatic relations with Britain over Rho
desia.

But in announcing this action, Nyerere explained

that:
I should perhaps, add that breaking diplomatic relat
ions with the British Government does not at present mean
that Tanzania will be leaving the Commonwealth,
The Com
monwealth is a multi-national organization, and although it
is still true that Britain, for historical reasons, has a
very special place in the Commonwealth, it is no longer the
British Commonwealth - it is a Commonwealth of free nations.
....But loyalty to the Commonwealth, and support for its
principles is impossible without loyalty to the Organization
of African Unity.
2?
Nyerere's current view about the Commonwealth is more mode
rate than what he expressed in the Royal Commonwealth Jour
nal of December 1961, that if membership of the Commonwealth
was not in the "best interests of Tanganyika's efforts to ad
vance the unity and welfare of people in the continent,

28
Tanganyika would give up her Commonwealth membership".
It should be remarked that Nyerere really threatened to
leave the Commonwealth over South African membership in 1961,
South Africa had to withdraw her membership from the Asso
ciation over the allegation that her apartheid policy was
making a mockery of the multi-racial character of the Com
monwealth.
Another issue that seemed to have driven Tanzania away
from the Nest is the Vietnam war.

In his address to the

27
Mwalimu Julius E. Nyerere,
The Honour of Afr ic a , Dares-Salaam, National Printing Co. Ltd. Dec. 1965,
pp. 11-14.

28
Julius K. Nyerere,

Freedom and U n i t y , p. 136.
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TANU Conference on October l6, 1967, President Nyerere as
sailed U.S. presence in Vietnam and said that;
Ne are told that great principles are involved, and
that the richest nation on earth is defending those prin
ciples against attack....But if this is a civil war, what
are outside nations doing in that conflict?....
The U.S.A.
must recover from the delirium of power, and return to the
principles upon which her nation was founded.
29
Of course, strained relations with the U.S. were not enti
rely based on Tanzania's opposition to American involvement
in Vietnam.

The essential issue seemed to have developed

from the alleged Western plot of November 1964 according to
which Foreign Minister Kambona claimed that a n ’American
Congo-based conspiracy was planning to overthrow the Tan
zanian Government.

In a rally at Dar-es-Salaam on November

15, 1964, President Nyerere said;
Ne get this news.
The U.S. Government is tired of see
ing Dar-es-Salaam being used by the Chinese to the detriment
of the Western countries and for the purpose of breaking
the peace of Africa.
And that their Government has decided
to put an end to this....My brothers, we are not gods.
Ne
are human beings.
Ne have been threatened too much in the
past. Wliat should we have done?....It was only the other
day that Portugal threatened us;
and then today we get the
news....30
In concluding the speech, Nyerere declared that the American
Ambassador had denied reports of the conspiracy but, not
withstanding, he would hand over the documents to the Amba
ssador for examination.

After this incident, distrust and

29
Julius K. Nyerere,
pp. 5-6.

Tanzania Policy on Foreign Affairs,

30
Nilliam Tordoff,
Government and Politics in Tanzania,
Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 19 6 7 ,
p. 1 7 6 .
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suspicions developed within the Government against America.
In 1 9 6 5 another quarrel flared up in Dar-es-Salaam
which culminated in the expulsion of two Senior American
diplomats from Tanzania for subversive activities.

The

United States struck back by expelling one of the officials
in the Tanzanian Embassy at Washington.

Each country re

called its Ambassador for consultations but results did
not show any appreciable diplomatic understanding between
the two countries.

Of recent, the U.S. announced the wind-

Ing-up of its Peace Corps program in Tanzania.

Tanzania

was one of the first nations in the world picked by the U.S.
for the Peace Corps program.

From the former strength of

over 400, the Peace Corps delegation is now eleven in Tan
zania.

The program is scheduled to be scrapped entirely by

the end of 19&9.

A Peace Corps official said recently that,

"In a sense, it's a marriage that has had a very rocky go
of it.

We know what their (Tanzania's) feelings are.

they know we'll leave q u i e t l y " . 81

And

Some of the past depar

tures stemmed from charges of espionage activities against
the Peace Corps workers.
No doubt, the foregoing discussion would leave one with
the impression that Tanzania's nonalignment has not been
favourable to the West, yet Nyerere has not deliberately
pursued an anti-West policy.

For example, in spite of the

low-level diplomatic relations with Britain, U.S. and West

The Christian Science Monitor. Boston, Thursday, February
2 7 , 1969, p. 5 .
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Germany, Nyerere has encouraged the presence of Canadian
teachers and C.U.S.O. volunteers.

In 196? Canada complet

ed a supply of #15 million worth of military aid to Tanza
nia.

The aid consisted of Caribous and the air-transport

wing of the defense forces.

Negotiations had also been con

cluded to increase the Canadian assistance for the building
32
of a military academy in the"northern town of Arusha.
In
recent years attempts have been made

to develop

closerela

tions with Japan.

of a visit

to Tokyo in

At the completion

November 1967, Economic Development Minister Bomani signed
a credit agreement worth of 967,000 pounds with the ExportImport Bank of Japan for the finance of a cashew nut pro
cessing plant at Mtwara in Southern Tanzania.
In September 1968, President Nyerere announced the res
toration of diplomatic relations with Britain after a suc
cessful Canadian mediation.

This is a significant develop

ment with quite uncertain implications.

Vfhile Britain has

not changed her stand on the use of force to bring down the
Rhodesian Smith Government, Tanzania joined her Commonwealth
colleagues in the January 1969 Conference in London.

Rep

orters even claimed that Nyerere was surprisingly moderate
on the Rhodesian issue and that he played considerable in
fluence on the attitude of other African members to the

3
See the Canadian 1967 Annual Reuort for the Department
of External Affairs, Queen's Printer and Controller
of Stationery, Cat. No. EL-1 9 6 7 , Ottawa, 19 6 8 , p.43.
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British Government.

However, Nyerere gave an indication

of flexibility when he said on October 16, 1967 that:
Most other African states took a different view of
the O.A.U. Resolution than we did, and of those that acted
with us, some have now reconsidered their position.
In
these circumstances it will be for the Tanzanian Government
in the coming months to consider what action will best
serve our continuing purposes.33
Lastly, Tanzania's international relations present some ele
ments of curiosity.

It would seem that her desire to stick

to the principle of self-determination in Africa, her pre
ference for friendship with the Great Powers and the reject
ion of reliability on any have, often times, led her into
conflicts with the West.

However,

one wonders why the

Soviet involvement has been so minimal as to be almost
negligible.

Surely the East Germans give some aid and tech

nical assistance to Tanzania, especially Zanzibar.

But there

seems to be little doubt that China's considerable presence
has reduced Soviet involvement.

Indeed, President Nyerere

should be trusted on his views that, "any real discussion
of the nonalignment of Tanzania's foreign policy should
therefore be based on an examination of what we do, more
than on what is said p u b l i c l y " . 34
If Kenya's "moderate" nonalignment is pro-West, and
Tanzania is acclaimed as an African pacesetter for radical

33

J.K. Nyerere, Tanzania on Foreign Affairs, p. 12.

34

Irene Brown, "Studies on Nonalignment", The Journal of
Modern African Studies, Vol. 4, Nol 47 December
1966, p. 5 2 2 .
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foreign policy, Uganda's relations with East and Nest are,
perhaps, the best example of a truly

nonaligned policy.

her relations with the Great Powers,

Uganda has tried to

maintain a scrupulous neutralism.

In

Consequently, President

Obote accepts financial and technical aid from Britain and
the United States and military aid from the Soviet Union,
China and Czechoslovakia.

»

To a large extent, aid is essentially a part of an in
dividual country's relations with Uganda.

While historic

associations and the capitalist structure of the economy
have brought Ugandan trade relations closer to the Nest,
President Obote has deliberately tried to court Communist
aid in order to offset any alleged alignment with the Nest.
The encouragement of the East and Nest missions to the U g 
andan borders and Obote's occasional visits to the Eastern
countries demonstrate that the Ugandan Government views
foreign aid in political terms.

In his state visit to the

People's Republic of China in 1965, President Obote nego
tiated an interest-free loan of #13.4 million from China and
35
invited Chou en Lai to visit Uganda.
In his attempt to
negotiate and receive aid from East and Nest, Obote has em
phasized his desire to remain on friendly terms with the
two camps.

In his opening address to the Council on World

Tensions Conference held in May 1965 at Makerere, he explain
ed :
35
News in Brief, Africa Report. Vol.10, No.9, October 6 5 ,
p. 59.
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Suppose we in Uganda wanted to experiment with growing
swamp rice on the shores of one of our lakes.
It might turn
out that the best combination for the project would be Amer
ican and some Chinese advisers.
It is questionable whether
we would be likely to get assistance for a project put to
gether on this basis.
If we could do so it might be of
value not only to us but also to other nations concerned.36
Certainly a combined aid operation between U.S.A. and China
seems remote at the moment but President Obote is ready to
accept assistance from China»in the. same spirit as aid is
received from other foreign sources, without discriminationor prejudice.

So far, aid from the Communist countries is

not as extensive as that from the Nest.

The Soviet Union

has offered 5.5 million pounds in long-term credits to build
a textile factory, a training centre specializing in mech
anical agriculture, meat refrigerating installations and a
dairy factory.

Arrangements have also been concluded with

the Soviet Union for the supply of bulldozers and tractors
for road construction.
Obote's attitude to the Commonwealth has also allowed
Uganda to receive technical and development aid from the
Association.

Since independence, Britain has remained the

largest source of external financial assistance to the
Ugandan Development Plan.
To maintain the momentum of development expenditure
after the aid already agreed before independence was ex
hausted (which was by mid-1963), the U.K. Government made
a grant to Uganda of 1.5 million pounds and a Commonwealth
Assistance Loan of 2.4 million pounds.
This brought the

Ralph Clark, Aid in Uganda - Programmes and Policies.
England, The Overseas Development Insti
tute Ltd., 1 9 6 6 , p. 46.
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total of British financial aid from July 1 9 6 I to 8.6 million
p o u nd s....There was further a grant of 50,000 pounds for im
provements to the Uganda Rifles barracks at Jinja and the
United Kingdom continued to meet part of the cost of milita
ry forces - up to 200,000 pounds - until 31st of March,
1 9 6 3 . 37
In recent times the Commonwealth Assistance loan has been
used to finance Group Farming Scheme and a television sta
tion.

The Group Farming Scheme was started in 1963 along

with the introduction of mechanized agriculture for which
the British loan was requested.

Thus, British assistance

has been of extreme importance to Uganda.
it, the Ugandan economy would collapse.

In fact, without
On the other hand,

U.S. financial aid has been operating on specific projects
handled by the Peace Corps and the Agency for International
Development.

In terms of outright grants and financial aid,

American assistance has been small until recently.

In the

first three years of the Five-Year Plan, U.S. aid amounted
to 2.2 million pounds in loans and grants but in 1966 the
loan had gone up to 6 million pounds.
However, it is the military supply to Uganda that has
generated some confusion.

For some years after independen

ce, Uganda relied on Israel for the training of the army,
the air force and the supply of Fouga-Magister that could
carry rockets.

More recently. President Obote has turned

to the Communist world for military air-support.

In August

1 9 6 8 , Foreign Minister Odaka explained that:

37
Ib id , p. 4 9 .
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Ne have also, in the course of building up our army,
purchased certain arms and ammunition from the Soviet Union
and from Czechoslovakia.
Again, I want to assure you that
neither the arms nor the ammunition could be said to have,
in themselves, any communistic inclinations.
Nor can the
arms we purchase from Belgium, Australia, Britain or from
Israel, be labelled capitalistic.
The fact that you buy
these arms from such sources can easily make you unpopular
in certain quarters.
38
Obote's use of this diverse arrangement of military supply
and training is intended to*bolster Uganda's nonalignment
policy.
With Kenya showing renewed suspicion of all the Commu
nist powers and Tanzania becoming increasingly hospitable
to the Chinese, Uganda might seem to offer the Russians
their best opportunity to extend their influence into East
and Central Africa.
But there is no panic among Western
observers in Kampala.
None doubts that President Obote is
sincere in his nonalignment, and shrewd enough to handle all
comers.
39
Thus, President Obote seems to have been more realistic and
less partisan in his application of a nonaligned policy than
his immediate neighbours in East Africa.
POLICIES TO THE UNITED NATIONS
The admissions of the East African states to the United
Nations have roughly coincided with the phenomenal influx of
ne w members to the Organization since I960.

Generally, but

in differing ways, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania have expressed
faith and unflinching support for the ideals of the United

38
S. N. Odaka,
Speech on Our Institutions and Foreign
Aspe c ts , Entebbe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
August 3, 1 9 6 8 , p. 6.
39
Charles Taylor,
"Obote's Plan to be Master of his Bord
ers",
Globe and M a i l , Toronto, May l4, 1968, p.?.
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Nations,

But Tanzania's support for the Organization is,

probably, a result of Tanganyika's colonial association with
the Trusteeship Council.

In his maiden speech to the United

Nations General Assembly on December 14, 1961, President
Nyerere expressed the view that:
Ne feel a special gratitude and loyalty to the United
Nations because we are conscious of the debt we owe to the
Trusteeship Council and, of course, to this General Assembly
Our pleasure at being accepted as a Member of the United
Nations is a recognition that we have been given the right
to join in the search for greater harmony between the peo
ples of the world.
4o
By approving the termination of the trusteeship agreements
in Tanganyika, the U.N. formally sanctioned national inde
pendence and the full participation of mainland Tanzania in
the deliberations of the World Organization.

Even with Kenya

and Uganda, where the U.N. did not directly influence the
liquidation of colonialism, it has performed a validating
function.

For the two countries, membership has endowed them

with a degree of legitimacy and enhances their status as
separate entities.

Also, on account of their militancy

against colonialism, the U.N. forum is commonly regarded as
the appropriate place for the furtherance of pan-Africanist
ideals of decolonization.
In Kenya, anticolonialist sentiments figure very pro
minently on the foreign policy.

Often times, the Government

has carried this passion to the U.N.

Consequently, Kenya

regards the U . N . , "not so much as an Organization primarily
■5Ô
J, K. Nyerere,

Freedom and Un i t y , pp. 144-145.
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designed to ensure peace and security- as the big powers
intended it to be - but as an organization which should be
1+1

primarily concerned with human rights at large".

In his

speech to the General Assembly in 1964, Foreign Minister
Murumbi said that:
There are still millions of our African brothers in
South Africa, Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique, French Somali
land and the Spanish colonies who are living under the
worst forms of human oppression.
They are denied the right
to self-determination;
the regimes imposed upon them by
brute force have stamped out their fundamental rights and
freedoms, contrary to the United Nations Charter, the Uni
versal Declaration of Human Rights and the various other
international instruments intended to promote human rights
throughout the world.42
Of course, all the African countries use the U.N. forum to
condemn colonialism but Kenya certainly thinks that the
Organization should also promote international morality
especially that relates to the rights of the oppressed
peoples and weak nations.

In his own evaluation of the

role of the United Nations in respect to the liquidation
of colonialism, President Nyerere thinks that the Organi
zation should assume more responsibility in this task.

He

said:
We do not see how it is possible for any single nation
to be judge of its own cause, as some colonial powers decide
to be judges of their own causes.
We would therefore like
to see, the united Nations assume the responsibility of being
judge.^8

41
Ali A. Mazrui, The United Nations and Some African
Political Attitudes, International Organization.
Vol. XVIIl,
No. 3i Summer 1964, p. 503.
42

43

Murumbi-Kenya, U.N. General Assembly. 19th Session.
Official Records. A/PV. 1293, December 7, 1964,
p. 3.
J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and U n i t y , p. 151.
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The above views of President Nyerere are not very specific
on what the U.N.

should do in respect of decolonization,

but, one can assume that he wants more effective sanctions
against countries impeding total liquidation of colonialism
i n Africa.
Closely related to the East African calls for decolo»
nization and the persistent advocation for peace with
justice all over the world is also the agitation for the
admission of Communist China into the World Organization
In 1 9 6 3 , Uganda and Tanganyika voted with thirty-nine other
members in a bid to seat the Chinese People's Republic in
the General Assembly.

In 1964, Kenya gained membership to

the U.N. and voted in 1965 for another resolution urging
the admission of China to the U.N.

From the time of their

membership to the Organization, all the East African states
have consistently voted for the Admission of China to the
U.N.

44

In their speeches, the East Africans argue that

the exclusion of the Chinese People's Republic is a mis
carriage of justice by the international community of
nations and that continued isolation of a nuclear power and
the most populous state in the world is an unrealistic
policy for an organization which regards itself as a repo
sitory of power in the preservation of world peace.

The

East African attitude can, perhaps, best be illustrated by
the Ugandan Foreign Minister Odaka's speech to the General
Assembly in 1964.

44------See Lincoln P. Bloomfield, "China, the United States s.nd
the United Nations", International Organization. Vol. XX,
No. 4. Autumn 1966, pp. 672-676 for the East African voting
behavior on the admission of the Chinese Peoples Republic
to the United Nations.
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In the submission of my delegation, the question of
whether there is one China or two Chinas should not be per
mitted to cloud the issue.
The People's Republic of China
representing as it does the world's oldest and most popul
ous country must be represented in this Organization.
In
considering the question of the admission of the People's
Republic, we must not be prejudiced by ideological, econo
mic or political considerations.
We should be guided only
by our determination to make this Organization truly univ
ersal and an effective instrument for the preservation of
world peace.
45
In fact, the East African states and other militantly anti
apartheid countries in Africa would settle for the expulsion
of South Africa from and the admission of China to the U.N.
They think that racial discrimination and the attendant
violation of human rights are the real potential threats to
world peace.

They sometimes go all their way to predict

that a black and white racial confrontation in South Africa
would result into a holocust with implications affecting
the whole world.

In this setting of rationalization, it

would appear that the East African states - and many O.A.U.
members, for that matter - tend to put more emphasis on the
demands "making human rights fundamental to peace rather
46
than vice versa".

.

Quite apart from providing opportunities for the ex
pression of important viewpoints affecting Africa and world
peace, the U.N. has afforded the East African states econo-

45
Odaka-Uganda, U.N. General Assembly, 19th Session,
Official Records, A/PV. 1293, December 1964,
pp. 72-75.
46
Ali A. Kazrui,
International Organization,
1964, p. 509.

Summer,
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mie and easy contact with other members of the international
community.
that,

For example, after independence Uganda stated

"it is very expensive both in manpower and finance to

open and maintain an embassy and, therefore, as a develop
ing country, Uganda is reluctantly forced to limit severely
47
the number of missions she establishes".
Similarly, when
ÇTanganyika became independent, she announced an austerity
allocation of embassies to only three countries and the
greatest priority was given to the U.N. Mission.

In the cal

culations and thinking of Nyerere and the Ugandan Government,
New York is a highly useful ambassadorial listening post,
undoubtedly, the best place in the world to pick up infor
mation on other governments.

Perhaps they are right;

a

researcher once remarked that the United Nations:
provide voluminous documentation that covers virtually
all international problems.... This documentation is, of
course, more important to some nations than it is to others.
For smaller nations and nations not directly involved in
some issues, the United Nations information sources may pro
vide virtually all of the data on which national positions
are based.
48
No less influential on the attitudes of the East African
states to the World Organization are the U.N. technical and
economic development assistance to Kenya, Tanzania and Ug
anda.

Aids are channelled through specialized agencies like

47
Government of Uganda,
Uganda's Foreign Policy Since In
dependence , Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Entebbe,
Uganda, 1968, p. 8.
48
David K. Marvin,

Emerging Africa in World Affairs, p.242,
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the Food and Agriculture Organization,
zation,
ment,

World Health Organi

International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop
the Economic Commission for Africa and supplemented

by the Expanded Technical Assistance Program.

Upon becoming

independent, the East African countries found themselves
without adequate staffs of qualified nationals and in need
»
of substantial numbers of foreign personnel to keep the gov
ernmental and economic machine going.

Assistance was also

needed in the training of Africans for the eventual takeover
of the administration.

The U.N. Technical Assistance has

been of immense help to these states in filling the gaps
left by colonial administration and also in the provision
of funds and material aids for development.

Through the

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
a medium of dialogue and increased trade involvement with
the outside world has been established.
No doubt, these material privileges have bolstered the
support of the East African countries for the United Nations.
Jomo Kenyatta acknowledged this when he said, on the United
Nations’ Day in October 1964 that, "beyond its great purpose
in political philosophy and adjustment, we in Kenya apprec-iate very greatly the practical efforts and aid of the
United Nations, through its specialized agencies in the
II
field"o

Foreign Minister, Odaka puts it in another way when

49
Jomo Kenyatta,

Harambee!

p. 57.
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he said that, "even without material or other benefits Ug50
anda's faith in the United Nations is strong".
Since ec
onomic development remains a strong force in East African
politics and to the extent that these states make the fight
for justice, international morality and the preservation of
human rights the conditions for world peace, Kenya, Tanza
nia and Uganda will continue to support the United Nations
and its ideals.

50
S. N. Odaka - Uganda,
U:;N. General Assembly Records,
A/PV 1294,
December 1964, p. 87.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
Within the three preceding chapters, attempts have been
made to analyse the foreign
states
world.
is not

policies of the three East African

in relation to other African countries and the outside
Of course,the consideration of a foreign policy
exclusively confined to the examination of daily

patterns of interaction between states.

It encompasses a

wide range of related factors such as the consideration of
national interests and capabilities - tangible and intangible
- which influence the decisions of the policy-makers.
In most countries,

foreign policy is largely influenced

by national interests and domestic policies.

The fact that

the East African States are generally poor, young on the
international scene and still at the initial stage of economic
development have increased domestic influence on their foreign
policy formulations.

In spite of their general lack of

capital and natural resources, they want an accelerated socio
economic development.

Consequently, the decision-makers,

on

the whole, choose to be pragmatic in their foreign policy
orientations.

They express the desire to receive aid from

foreign powers if it would not involve a loss of independence.
Also the demands for decolonization of the dependent African
states and the desire not to participate in Cold War conflicts
make Pan Africanism and nonalignment the focus of foreign

117
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policy orientations of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.
Pan-Africanism is very difficult to define but in part
icular reference to the East African foreign policies, it
serves two outstanding purposes.

Firstly, it serves as a

driving force for the liquidation of colonialism in Africa.
Decolonization is an objective to which all independent
»
African states are committed, although with varying degrees
of zeal.

In East Africa, it is a logical extension of the

belief in fundamental human rights and the right of small
. states to self-determination.

Also on account of their geo

graphical proximity to the dependent areas of Southern Africa,
the East African states feel a special moral obligation to
help fellow Africans whose rights to freedom have been vio
lated.

However,

their ability to implement decolonization

policy on their own is limited; therefore, they choose to
work through the Organization of African Unity and the
United Nations.
It would be misleading, notwithstanding, to give the
impression that the three East African states uphold deco
lonization with the same degree of tenacity.

They each

declare in their foreign and domestic policies that their
independence will not be complete until colonialism is
completely eradicated on the African continent but the
Rhodesian issue has proved the extent to which Kenya and
Uganda would act in the pursuit of this policy.

Despite

the O.A.U. resolution of December 3-, 1965 that member
states should break off diplomatic relations with Britain
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if she failed to crush the Smith Government by December 15,
only Tanzania honoured this pledge.

The desire not to

alienate the British Government which provides a substantial
development assistance to Kenya and Uganda was probably
responsible for their apparent inability to implement the
O.A.U. resolution.

If this interpretation is correct, Kenya

and Uganda could be regarded as selfish and hypocritical in
respect of their decolonization policy.

On the other hand,

Tanzania could be regarded as the only country that has
consistently pursued her decolonization policy since inde
pendence.

The 1 9 6 3 decision of the O.A.U. to base the head

quarters of the African Liberation Committee in Dar-es-Salaam
was probably a tribute to the support and devotion which
Tanganyika was giving to the cause of liberation.
Secondly, Pan-Africanism constitutes an ideological
base for the foreign policy orientation of the East African
states to other African countries.

It is used to promote

friendliness between states and to suppress hostilities
around the borders.

Put in another way, Pan-Africanism is

a positive effort to achieve such identification between
African states to facilitate brotherhood solidarity and
functional co-operation.

The principle that underlay the

inauguration of the "Good Neighbor" Summit of I 9 66 at
Nairobi is fundamental to this line of analysis.
Support for the O.A.U. is another significant foreign
policy orientation of the East African states.

Since its

inceptior, the O.A.U. has been concerned with the limitation
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of outside involvement in African affairs.

By approving

the O.A.U. Charter, Article III, Section 7, which recommends
that member states should pursue "a policy of nonalignment
with regard to all blocs", the East African states have
identified with the O.A.U. attempts to immunize African
states against Cold War conflicts.

However, their choice

of nonalignment in the conduct of their relations with
outside world should be more appropriately explained in
terms of national interests.

It is difficult to conclude

that Tanzania which ignored an O.A.U. resolution

in her

recognition of Biafra or Kenya and Uganda which failed to
honour their pledge on the Rhodesian issue have adopted
nonalignment, primarily as a demonstration of their loyalties
to the O.A.U. Charter.
The East African leaders start from the assumption
that contemporary global international affairs are dominated
largely by the conflicts between the Communist and the
Western powers, more particularly by the rivalries between
the United States, the Soviet Union and China.

In their

foreign policy formulations they have expressed the unwilling
ness to participate in the conflicts that have no relevance
to their domestic policies.

Besides, having just emerged

from the colonial status, they are deeply apprehensive of
losing their sovereignties to foreign powers.

Consequently,

they choose to be friendly with all the major Powers and
reject the possibility of an absolute reliance on any.
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Their dedication to policies of rapid economic development
also make them declare their willingness to receive aid
from both East and West, without prejudice or discrimi
nation.

The findings in this research show, however, that

Kenya looks to the West for patterns of government,
gical orientation and aid for development.

ideolo

Tanzania looks

towards China for direction on economic developments based
on self-reliance, and Uganda has consciously maintained
her'.nonalignment by actively seeking aid from both East
and West.

Whether attitudinal behaviours have been favou

rable to the East or West or positively neutral,

it seems

that all the East African states have been getting economic
benefits from the pursuit of their nonaligned policy.
Lastly, the brief analysis of the East African policies
to the United Nations reveals that the three states share
some confidence in and support for the Organization.

How 

ever, there is a tendency on the parts of the states to
assume that the United Nations is largely influenced by
the Western bloc.

They see the inability of the United

Nations to enforce decolonization in South-West Africa and
Rhodesia as a result of Western acquiescence to the policies
of the regimes in Pretoria and Salisbury.

They think that

U.N. intervention in the Congo was influenced by the Western
countries.

Although they did not specifically condemn the

U.N. action, they blamed the Western countries and supported
the O.A.U. Conciliation Commission under Jomo Kenyatta in
appealing to President Johnson to end U.S. military inter
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vention in the Congo.
The East African states also contend that the U.N.
seems to reflect the old European system of international
relations.

Nyerere has even suggested that the Organization

should be reconstituted so that it can effectively promote
the dignity of man,
members.

justice and the well-being of all

The two other East African leaders would probably

agree to this proposition but it is hard to see whether
there is any marked difference between the proposition and
the present structure and operation of the U.N.
Similarly, on account of their stated policies on
colonialism, and their faith in the rights of small states
to self-determination,

it would seem that the East African

states, especially Tanzania, would reject any attempt to
make the declared United Nations purpose of maintaining
international peace and security the number one priority
if it enables the Western countries to maintain a colonial
status quo in Africa.

Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania have been

joining other Afro-Asian countries in demanding that Britain
should use force in crushing the rebellion in Rhodesia.
They have also made concerted efforts with other African
states to end South African participation in various Inter
national Conferences because of her apartheid policy.

They

seem to have brought their own priorities to the United Nations
and would like to interpret world politics in terms of these
priorities.

To the extent that policies are largely influ

enced by demands for total decolonization in Africa and the
priorities of human rights. East African attitudes to the
United Nations will remain ambiguous.
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^APPENDIX I
' TEE FEDERATION DECLARATION OF
5TK JD1Œ, 19'63
The following statement was issued in Nairobi on
?•

Wednesday,

-

June 5, 1963 by the President of the Republic

of Tanganyika, Dr. Julius K. Nyerere;
of Uganda Dr. Milton A. Obote;

the Prime Minister

and the Prime Minister of

■

Kenya, Mr. Jomo Kenyatta:
We, the leaders of the people and Governments of East
Africa assembled in Nairobi on June 5, 1963, pledge oursel
ves to the political Federation of East Africa.
Our meeting today is motivated by the spirit of PanAfricanism and not by mere selfish Regional interests.

We

are nationalists and reject tribalism, racialism or inward
looking policies.

We believe that the day of decision has

come and to all our people we say there is no more room
for'slogans and words.

This is our day of action in the

cause of the ideals that we believe in and unity and free
dom for which we have suffered and sacrificed so much.
Within this spirit of Pan-Africanism and following
the declaration of African unity at the recent Addis Ababa
conference practical steps should be taken wherever possible

123
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to accelerate the achievement of our common goal.
We believe that the East African Federation can be a
practical step towards the goal-of Pan-African unity.

We

hope that our action will help to accelerate the efforts
A
already being made by our brothers throughout the Continent
to achieve Pan-African unity.
We share a common past and are convinced of our com
mon destinies.

We have a common history, culture and

customs which make our unity both logical and natural.
Our futures are inevitably bound together by the identical
aspirations and hopes of our peoples and the need for si
milar efforts in facing the tasks that lie ahead of each
of our free nations.
In the past century the hand of Imperialism grasped
the whole Continent and in this part of Africa our people
found themselves included together in what the Colonialists
styled "The British sphere of influence” .

Now that we are

once again free or are on the point of regaining our free
dom we believe the time has come to consolidate our unity
and provide it with a constitutional basis.
For some years we have worked together in the PAFMECA
where we have accepted common objectives and ideas and
created the essential spirit of unity between ourselves
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and among our people.

We are happy that with K A N U ’s vic

tory in the Kenya elections we now have in the three East
African countries Governments which are fully committed to
genuine African nationalism and Pan-African unity.
For 4o years the Imperialists and local settler mino
rities tried to impose political federation upon us.
people rightly resisted these attempts.

Our

Federation at

that time would quickly have led to one thing - a vast
White dominated dominion.
The East Africa High Commission and its successor
the Common Services Organization have taught us the value
of links in the economic field.

Indeed it was the recog

nition of the value of these connections which led the
two fully Independent members to agree to continue parti
cipation after they had achieved their freedom.

In many

practical ways we already are co-operating - in scientific
research; in communications and in postal services.

An

important factor in view of our determination to achieve
Federation is the existence of shared currency;

a leading

aspect of economic working together is the functioning of
the E.A. Common Market.
Thus the value of working together has been adequately
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demonstrated in the E.A.C.S.O. and in the Common Market
hut the scope for further joint action remains wide.
Economic planning, maximum utilisation of manpower and
our other resources, the establishment of a Central Bank
A
and common defence programme and foreign and diplomatic
representation are areas in which we need to work toge
ther.

Such approach would provide greater co-ordination

and savings in both scarce capital, facilities for train
ing and manpower.

What is more we would have a total

population of some 25 million people - a formidable force
and a vast market to influence economic development at
home, attract greater investment and enhance our prestige
and influence abroad.
The movement towards popular Government and Indepen
dence in our various countries of recent years has brought
forward the issue of truly popular Governments in each
country and removes fears of minority or settler domina
tion under Federation.
We believe a political Federation of East Africa is
desired by our peoples.

There is throughout East Africa

a great urge for unity and an appreciation of the signi
ficance of Federation.
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We are aware that local and territorial factors have
to be taken into account.

We firmly believe that ways

can be devised of overcoming any fears and of surmounting
such difficulties.

Special attention will be paid to the

accommodation of relevant territorial interests in draw
ing up the constitution of the East African Federation.
We believe, in fact, that some of these territorial pro
blems can be solved in the context of such an East African
Federation.
As already mentioned we have some basis for a Joint
endeavour in the political as well as in the economic
spheres.

The Common Services authority was conceived as

a body for this purpose although up to now its function
ing was greatly hampered partly by the sharing of Kenya
representation on the Authority but largely by the lack
of central political direction.

The various Ministerial

committees and the Central Legislative Assembly, especia
lly since it became properly representative have demons
trated the need for such direction.
We are convinced that the time has now come to create
such central political authority.
Having stated our aims we wish now to announce the
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steps we are taking to achieve the implementation of these
aims.
A Working Party is being established which will pre
pare a framework of a draft constitution for the Federation
of East Africa.

It will report back to a full Conference

of East African Governments.

In its work it will consult

with the three Governments and with their consent may co
opt constitutional or other experts.

The E.A.C.S.O. will

be associated with these deliberations.
In the third week of August a full scale Conference
will be convened to consider the proposals of the Working
Party.
At this point we must express our happiness at the
victory of KANTJ in the Kenya elections.

While welcoming

the results of the Kenya elections, we must declare most
strongly our opposition to any attempt to delay the coun
try's achievement of Independence any longer.

The ruling

party has a clear mandate for Independence and we must
regard it as an unfriendly act if Britain uses the pre
text of some minority interest or other to prevent Kenya
Joining the free nations at the earliest possible moment.
We are closely involved in this matter now since a hold
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up in Kenya's advance to Independence will hinder the
achievement of Federation to which we are committed.

The

three Governments, having agreed to the establishment of
a Federation this year, expect the British Government to
Î’
grant Kenya's Independence immediately.
Although Zanzibar is not represented at this confe
rence we must make it clear that that country is invited
to participate fully in our plans for Federation.
As soon as Zanzibar has held its elections next
month its Government will be invited to take part in the
functioning of the Working Party and of any other body
which may be set up as a result of our plans to build a
Federation.
We reiterate that our plans for the Federation of
East Africa are the logical promotion of the spirit of
Pan-African unity and wish to make it, therefore, clear
that any of our other neighbours may in future Join this
Federation.
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APPENDIX II
EAST AFRICA COMMON SERVICES
The general administration of services common to Kenya,
Uganda and Tanzania by the East Africa High Commission
in pre-independence days was taken over by the East Africa
Common Services Organisation in 1962, Policy was control
led by the Premiers of the three states sitting as the
East Africa Common Services Authority,

There were five

committees of three Ministers, one from each territory,
to control the five groups of services:

Communications

(railways, harbours, posts and telecommunications, civil
aviation and meteorology);

Finance (income tax, customs

and excise collection, and administration of the General
Fund for the various services);
Co-ordination;

Commercial and Industrial

Social and Research Sciences;

Relations and Co-ordination of Labour,

Industrial

The Central Le 

gislative Assembly, responsible for passing the legisla
tion for the administration of the common services, con
sists of a Speaker,

15 Ministers (five from each state),

27 members (nine from each state and elected by their
legislatures), and two official members (the SecretaryGeneral and the Legal Secretary).
130
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On 6 June 1 967 in Kampala, President Kenyatta (Kenya),
President Obote (Uganda) and President Nyerere (Tanzania)
signed a 15-year treaty of economic co-operation which
came into force on 1 December 1967.

Under the treaty,

there will be an East Africa Development Bank, inter
territorial tariffs on goods originating in one state and
exported to another, replacement of the ministerial com
mittees, decentralisation of E.A.C.S.O., and the organisa
tion of an East Africa Economic Community of 25 million
people.
The Development Bank will promote financial and tech
nical assistance to industrial projects.

Priority will be

given to raising the industrial level of Uganda and Tanza
nia on a par with Kenya.

Each state will contribute an

initial L2 million each and it is hoped to raise
overseas.

million

The directors can call up a further BIO million

over consecutive five-year periods.

Tanzania and Uganda

will each get 38-3/4 per cent of the Bank's total invest
ment while Kenya will receive 22^ per cent.
A "transfer tax system" will allow a state that has
8. trading deficit with its partners to impose transfer
taxes on goods originating in these countries, up to the
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amount of the deficit, but only if similar goods are manu
factured, or are expected to be, within three months in the
tax-imposing country.

The protected industry will also

have a capacity to at least 15 per cent of domestic con
sumption or to a value of BI00,000 whichever is the less.
The tax will not exceed 50 per cent of the tariff on goods
originating outside East Africa, nor can it be imposed for
more than eight years.

Its aim will be to favour Tanzania

and allow her to compete freely with Kenya and Uganda with
which she had trade deficits.
The ministerial committee system for E.A.C.S.O. will
be replaced by a Minister for East Africa from each state,
permanently based on E.A.C.S.O which will be moved from
Nairobi to Arusha in northern Tanzania.

The Development

Bank and postal headquarters will be in Kampala;

East

African Railways and East African Airways in Nairobi;

and

the Harbour headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam.
The three Presidents will retain their authority as
the controlling body of the East Africa Economic Community;
a Common Market Council will handle the Community’s day-today affairs;
body.

and a tribunal will be created as a Judicial

Provision will also be made for the association or

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

133
active participation by Zambia, Burundi, Ethiopia and other
interested countries in the East Africa Common Market.
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